The Transition Triangle (3): The People, the Base of the Transition Triangle; the Force That Begins the Revolution, Legitimises the Transition and Chooses the Future S. Rouzbeh ۱۴۰۵/۰۶/۱۷ The people are the force for change, the source of legitimacy, partners in the transition and the final arbiters of Iran’s future; the people’s side completes the Transition Triangle. S. Rouzbeh – If the best plans for the day after the Islamic Republic were ready, and there were even a capable leader to coordinate the transition, but the people did not stand behind this movement, what would remain of the ‘Transition Triangle’? And if politicians, experts and different groups disagreed about Iran’s future, who, in the end, would have the right to make the final decision? In the previous two articles, I discussed ‘pre-transition capital’ and ‘the leader of the transition’. But the people’s side differs fundamentally from the other two. The people are not simply one of the three sides; they are the base on which the other two stand. However strong the plans and leadership may be, without the people they have neither the force to bring about change, nor legitimacy, nor the ability to shape the future. Until the two sides connect to the third, a triangle has not yet been formed. The role of the people in this process can be seen in four stages: change, legitimacy, participation and choice. First, the people are the force for change. No opposition can, on its own, change an established government from the outside. The opposition can present plans, build coordination and suggest a way forward, but the principal engine of change is the people who no longer accept the status quo: through protest and strikes, civil disobedience and social resistance. This shift in outlook in Iranian society did not happen overnight. Many protests began over rising prices, corruption, discrimination, social restrictions, injustice and repression, but over time a more fundamental question emerged: is the problem just governments and officials, or the structure itself? For a large part of society, hope for reform within this very structure has gradually given way to a demand for structural change. When a system’s own fundamental mechanisms restrict the possibility of genuine reform, protest against a policy or a government gradually turns into protest against the system itself. It is this shift in the people’s outlook that has increased the weight of the social side of the transition compared with the past. But social capital is not built on discontent alone; it must be able to turn into action. A person may, in theory, have every desirable quality in a leader: experience, eloquence, international connections, a political programme and an expert team. But if society does not respond to their call, a fundamental side is missing. In politics, the ability to mobilise society cannot be replaced by a CV. The calls of 18 and 19 Dey and the large gatherings of Iranians abroad were neither elections nor referendums, but they demonstrated a political reality: one call was able to turn into a real movement inside and outside the country. This is itself one indication of social capital and the ability to mobilise. If another group claims to have greater social capital, a more suitable leader or a more effective programme, it must show this in practice: present its programme, form an expert team, persuade society and demonstrate its ability to mobilise. Democracy is not built by eliminating a rival; it is built through competition to earn the people’s trust. But the people’s role does not end in the streets. The second stage is legitimacy. During the transition, swift and difficult decisions will be necessary, but even in an emergency, political legitimacy cannot come solely from a leader or experts. The transition leader can coordinate the country and experts can offer solutions, but the principal foundation must be society’s consent and trust. This is where a clear line must be drawn between ‘leadership of the transition’ and ‘political ownership of the country’. The leader of the transition may be responsible for coordination, crisis management and bringing the country to free elections, but the right to determine the final form of the system belongs to the people. The Crown Prince has also referred to this repeatedly in his speeches. The third stage is the people’s participation in the transition itself. Sometimes it is assumed that the people’s role ends with the fall of the previous government, and that from then on experts and an interim government should run the country. This view is incomplete. In the first days of the transition, society is not merely a spectator; it is a partner in safeguarding the country. Keeping government offices and hospitals operating, protecting public property, preventing acts of personal revenge, preserving workplaces and helping restore order are all part of that same social capital. A successful transition is not managed by leaders alone; society must carry it too. If public trust is lost, even the best technical plans will be difficult to implement. But if people feel they have a share in building the new order, the very force that drove back the previous government can become a force for protecting and stabilising the country. And the fourth stage is choice. I have said many times that the greatest Iranian scientist, a popular athlete, an actor and an ordinary worker each have only one vote when it comes to determining the country’s political future. This simple principle is the heart of democracy. No title, wealth, fame or record gives one citizen greater political rights than another. One person, one vote. So why should we fight today over the outcome of an election that has not yet taken place? Republicans, monarchists, the left, the right, liberals, nationalists and other democratic movements must be able to present their programmes, form parties, take part in elections and compete for the people’s votes. No one should declare themselves the certain winner or their rival eliminated before the people have voted. The task of the transition should be to bring Iran to the point where the people can freely elect representatives to a constituent assembly, or a similar body; where the future constitution can be drafted; and where, ultimately, the country’s political structure can gain legitimacy through the people’s vote. If this principle is accepted, much of today’s infighting among the opposition will become irrelevant. Anyone who claims to have the people’s support must demonstrate that support in the social arena and, ultimately, at the ballot box. Anyone with a better plan should present it. Anyone who proposes a more suitable leader should show how that person can bring social capital, expertise and the ability to coordinate together. Competition is not a threat to democracy; it is its condition. The problem begins when opposition crosses the line from political competition and becomes a permanent effort to stop every joint initiative, without offering a practical alternative. Because the people will not wait for the opposition’s debates to end. Society will find its own way. And perhaps it is precisely at this point that we can better understand the severity of the Islamic Republic’s repression. From this perspective, we can view the killings, imprisonment and executions. The aim is not merely to eliminate an individual protester; the government seeks to raise the cost of political participation for society as a whole and to break the social capital behind change. Bullets and executions are directed not only at those who have taken to the streets; they also send a message to those who have not yet come: taking part comes at a cost. What is being targeted is not just the protester, but the people’s side—the side without which no transition is possible. The government’s repression and executions can be seen as a sign that it senses the people’s inevitable return to the political arena. The government may discredit an opposition leader, threaten experts or portray opposition plans as insignificant—or do anything unimaginable. But when individual discontent turns into a collective will, the equation changes. This is where the Transition Triangle is completed. Capital before the transition provides the roadmap. The leader of the transition brings coordination and the ability to deliver. But the people are the force for change, the source of legitimacy, partners in the transition and its final arbiters. Without this side, however strong the other two may be, a triangle has not yet taken shape. And in the end, one question remains: If everyone claiming a stake in Iran’s future accepts that, ultimately, the people must decide, why is some of today’s energy spent preventing the emergence of the very force without which no transition is possible, instead of preparing for tomorrow’s free competition? Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/archive-09eaff67-e3f3-5207-3036-1808e48a07c1 Please credit the author and link to this edition.