When Will the People of Iran Rise Up? An Answer to Trump’s Question S. Rouzbeh ۲۰۲۶/۰۹/۰۳ Why should the people of Iran weigh the cost to their lives and the likely outcome before returning to the streets? They have risen repeatedly; the question is not whether they want change, but what will be different this time—and why they alone should be expected to take the risks without calculating the consequences. In recent days, I have read many articles about Donald Trump’s latest question, his promise that “help is on the way”, some Iranians’ distrust of US policy, and the cost of repression. But in my search, I rarely saw the issue framed from this angle: if governments are entitled to weigh the costs of war, oil, elections, trade and security before making any decision, why should the people of Iran not weigh the cost to their lives and the likely outcome before returning to the streets? I want to answer Trump’s question from this perspective. Mr Trump, people who, from the earliest years of the Islamic Republic to the present day, have repeatedly taken to the streets without being invited by other countries, and have been killed, imprisoned and executed—how are they supposed to prove that they want change? And when, on 15 March 2026, equivalent to 24 Esfand 1404, you said that Iranian protesters had no weapons, that the government had threatened to kill anyone who took to the streets, and that protesting in such circumstances was difficult, why did you ask those same people again on 1 September 2026, equivalent to 10 Shahrivar 1405: “When are the people of Iran going to rise up and fight?” The short answer is: the people of Iran have risen up many times. From women’s protests against compulsory hijab after the 1979 revolution to the student protests of 1378, the Green Movement of 1388, the protests of 1396 and 1397, November 2019, and “Woman, Life, Freedom”, different groups across society have repeatedly paid the price of protest with imprisonment, bullets and their lives. So the issue is not a lack of will to bring about change. The responses published to your latest question make this clear, too. Among the messages received by Iran International, recurring themes include “the people have been fighting for 47 years”, fear of another crackdown, concern that the United States will return to negotiations, and reminders of the promise that “help is on the way”. These messages are not a scientific poll, but they show that, for some Iranians, the central question is what will be different this time. Your three positions need to be considered together. On 13 January 2026, equivalent to 23 Dey 1404, you told Iranians to continue protesting and said “help is on the way”. On 15 March, you acknowledged that the protesters were unarmed and might be killed. On 1 September, you again asked why they were not rising up. The natural question is: what was that help, and what guarantee is there that the next round of protests will not once again result only in more deaths, prisoners and executions? The United States has, of course, taken action. It has attacked the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities, increased sanctions and economic pressure, and targeted some of the government’s military infrastructure. But attacking missiles and air defences is not the same as creating conditions in which a civil movement can continue without a massacre. If the aim is to support the people, we must ask which part of this policy has been specifically designed to reduce the regime’s capacity for domestic repression. The economy presents the same contradiction. Economic pressure restricts the government’s resources, but inflation, rising food prices and declining purchasing power directly affect people’s lives. On 2 September 2026, equivalent to 11 Shahrivar 1405, even the US Treasury Secretary said that people might rise up as a result of this very economic situation. This makes the question more urgent: should people who bear the cost of economic pressure also have to pay the principal cost of an uprising with their lives? The collapse of Iran’s economy does not necessarily mean the collapse of the Islamic Republic; it may first destroy people’s livelihoods. This is where the central point becomes clear. The US government itself also makes decisions by weighing costs and benefits. January reports on Trump’s retreat from an attack showed that concerns about a wider war, economic consequences, the safety of US forces and the response of regional allies had all figured in the White House’s calculations. Every government is entitled to weigh the cost of its decisions. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf also calculate the risks to their security, oil and trade, as well as the missile threat. China, Turkey and Iran’s other economic partners also make decisions based on their own interests. None of them enters the fray without calculating the risks. So why should the people of Iran alone be expected to put their lives on the line without calculating the consequences? This is not a defence of inaction. The people of Iran have not been inactive for 47 years. The point is their right to choose the timing, methods and conditions of their struggle. The people of Iran have not waited for an invitation from foreign governments to fight for themselves, either. In the recent protests, a large part of society took to the streets in most parts of the country in response to Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s call; but in the end, the decision about when and how to continue the struggle belongs to the people of Iran themselves, not to governments and foreign powers. A young person who knows they may not return home if they go out has as much right to weigh the risks as a government that calculates the price of oil, the elections or the safety of its soldiers before launching an attack. The question of the day after the Islamic Republic remains, too. An envoy of the Trump administration has met Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, and the Crown Prince has repeatedly said that the form of the future government should be determined by a vote of the people and that he is prepared for a transitional period. Political contact matters, but it does not yet amount to a clear strategy for preventing a power vacuum, preserving territorial integrity, maintaining essential services and reaching free elections. The United Nations has also reported on arrests, torture, enforced disappearances and the risk of execution in connection with the protests. But the gap remains: between condemnation and deterrence, between verbal support and a practical plan, and between calling on people to rise up and accepting responsibility for the consequences. The people of Iran are not playthings of foreign powers. They began their struggle before Trump and will continue it after him, at a time and in a way they themselves consider appropriate. So perhaps your question, “When are the people of Iran going to rise up?”, was never the right question to begin with. If every government claims the right to weigh the costs and benefits of its decisions, why should that same right not be recognised for a people whose cost is not dollars, oil or electoral votes, but their own lives? And if the people of Iran take to the streets once again, what exactly will you and the world do this time to ensure that it does not end with yet more names added to the lists of those killed, imprisoned and executed? Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/archive-1cede936-04f8-bbc5-9939-8a29876117e8 Please credit the author and link to this edition.