After Khamenei: The Crisis Is Not Just Succession, but the Transfer of Responsibility
S. Rouzbeh
۱۴۰۵/۰۱/۱۲

S. Rouzbeh examines the uncertainty surrounding Iran’s leadership after Ali Khamenei, arguing that while power may have been transferred hastily, responsibility for war, repression and political failure has not. Drawing on the film The Death of Stalin, the article describes a system in which authority is concentrated among a small circle while accountability remains obscured.

S. Rouzbeh – After Ali Khamenei’s removal, was the Islamic Republic able to demonstrate a clear, peaceful and credible transfer of power?

And if the answer is yes, why are there still signs of uncertainty, secrecy, faceless command and evasion of responsibility at the very highest level of power?

In authoritarian systems, a leader’s death is not merely a personal vacuum. A leader’s death suddenly reveals who was really making decisions, who was merely preserving the appearance of government, and who will later have to pay for all the failures. In the Islamic Republic, too, the question was not just who would succeed Khamenei; the deeper question was who would be saddled with responsibility for the war, repression, political failures and the country’s dead ends. The transfer of power may have taken place hastily, but the transfer of responsibility failed.

The first sign of this failure is the uncertainty at the very top of the hierarchy. A farewell ceremony for Khamenei was announced, but details of his funeral and burial were postponed. In an ordinary system, this delay might be merely an administrative matter, but in the Islamic Republic, which has always turned the deaths and funerals of its leaders into displays of power, it carries political meaning. The government has still not been able to impose the symbolic end of this period on society with any certainty. This leaves the gap between the official narrative and public belief open.

The second sign is the condition of the new leader himself. Reports say that Mojtaba Khamenei rose to power with decisive backing from the Revolutionary Guard, but remained silent for nearly 48 hours after his selection was announced and had still not appeared in public by the end of March. At the same time, accounts emerged that he had been injured. Here, there is a key point that must be stated plainly: uncertainty about whether the new leader is alive, injured or missing is itself a sign of weakness. In authoritarian systems, a successful transfer of power must be accompanied by an immediate display of presence, the quelling of rumours and the consolidation of command. If the new leader is unharmed but the government cannot show him, that is weakness. If he is injured and has had to be concealed, that is weakness too. In either case, the seat of power can no longer impose itself on society with certainty.

The third sign is the facelessness of command. The formal government remains in place, but the main decisions are coming from within a narrow circle. The president stays on to answer questions, but is pushed aside at pivotal moments in the war and foreign policy. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Guard has gained greater weight without taking full and public responsibility for the situation. The result is a structure in which the country is effectively in the hands of a few people, yet none of them is willing to say clearly where all the decisions are coming from. This is no longer transparent authority; it is command from the shadows.

The fourth sign is the nervous and widespread domestic repression. In recent days, Iranian judicial officials have spoken of more than a thousand arrests, around two hundred indictments, threats of execution and the confiscation of property over alleged intelligence cooperation. This severity smells more of fear than of confidence. Governments sure of their internal cohesion do not beat the drum of punishment and intimidation with such haste at the moment of a transfer of power.

To understand this atmosphere, the film The Death of Stalin is a useful example. This is a 2017 black political comedy directed by Armando Iannucci, a British-French-Belgian film about the turmoil within the Soviet leadership after Stalin’s death. The film’s important point is that, after the removal of the number-one man, everyone pretends that things are under control, while behind closed doors fear, rivalry, secrecy and evasion of responsibility are rife.

The clear parallel is this: in the film, the room where power is exercised is full of people who want to hold on to power, but none of them wants publicly to accept full responsibility for what is unfolding. Iran after Khamenei looks much the same, more or less: his death is announced, but its symbolic closure is not completed in society’s mind; a new leader is introduced, but is not seen; the Revolutionary Guard gains more power, but the ultimate command remains shrouded in mist; and the government must answer for crises it did not necessarily create. This is the moment when a government appears to grow harsher but, inwardly, becomes more unsteady.

The issue, then, is not just succession. The issue is that, after Khamenei, the Islamic Republic has entered a phase in which authority has been concentrated intensely in the hands of a small circle, while responsibility has been dispersed and concealed throughout the system. This combination is no sign of strength. It is the very smell of collapse from within: concentration of power, evasion of accountability, uncertainty at the top, and the governance of a large country by commanders who are more shadow than face.

Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/archive-45aa8c05-f5ae-ee89-d7f7-d400141dab32
Please credit the author and link to this edition.