Martial Law or Checkpoints: Instruments of Intimidation or Security? H. Soleimani ۱۴۰۴/۰۵/۱۶ H. Soleimani examines martial law and checkpoints, their place in Iranian law, the security forces’ roles during crises, and the consequences of controls imposed without an official declaration of martial law. H. Soleimani – In the wake of political and security crises, governments sometimes take measures that restrict civil liberties. Martial law is one such situation, in which the army or military forces take control of affairs and ordinary laws are temporarily suspended. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the formal declaration of martial law has been prohibited since the 1979 Revolution; however, evidence indicates that the government has in practice implemented measures resembling martial law (such as setting up extensive checkpoints) without an official declaration. In this article, I answer five key questions on this subject: What does martial law mean, and what measures are commonly taken during it? What is the status of martial law under Iranian law? Why are checkpoints set up during a crisis, and what are the duties of the armed forces (the Basij, the IRGC, the army and the law-enforcement force) in white, yellow and red alert situations? How has the Islamic Republic imposed comparable controls without declaring martial law, what have the consequences been (including the numbers wounded and killed over the past 46 years), and who is answerable for the blood unjustly shed? What do the laws on the use of firearms and the searching of vehicles say, what percentage of shootings have been lawful, and has the government been held accountable for them? Finally, I draw conclusions and consider what people inside Iran and Iranians abroad can do. 1. The definition of martial law and measures commonly taken around the world Martial law is an emergency situation in which military commanders, with the government’s approval or following a coup, take control of the administration of the country and suspend some ordinary laws. Strict regulations are usually imposed during martial law; for example, a night-time curfew is introduced, requiring people to be at home by a specified time, gatherings and movement are restricted, and military courts may replace ordinary courts. In other words, in a crisis such as war, revolt or widespread unrest, martial law is a means of ensuring security or preserving the government’s hold on power by temporarily depriving people of individual freedoms and transferring police powers to the armed forces. Historical examples can be found during wars or major unrest; for instance, in 2011, while declaring a state of emergency, the Egyptian army deployed tanks in the streets of Cairo. The imposition of martial law is generally accompanied by political violence and is used as a last resort to contain acute crises. Although martial law may be regarded as useful for maintaining public order in the short term, it usually attracts serious criticism, because it restricts civil liberties and infringes citizens’ rights. Measures commonly taken during martial law in various countries include imposing a curfew, strict media controls and censorship, extensive searches of people and vehicles, detaining opponents or suspects without due judicial process, and setting up checkpoints on roads. A military government may also make it easier for forces under its command to use coercive force, sometimes leading to the shooting of offenders or protesters. In short, under martial law the army takes on the role of the police, and ordinary laws (such as the rules of criminal procedure and people’s fundamental rights) are suspended to some extent. For this reason, martial law is often regarded as a violation of democracy and a sign of authoritarian rule. 2. Martial law under Iranian law Following the victory of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s new constitution explicitly prohibited the declaration of martial law. Article 79 of the Constitution states: “The establishment of martial law is prohibited. In time of war and similar emergency conditions, the government has the right, with the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, to impose temporarily the necessary restrictions, but in any case their duration may not exceed thirty days…” This article is considered one of the most important legacies of the 1979 Constitution. Under this article, no exception to the prohibition on martial law is specified, and no government official has the right to transfer executive affairs to the military. Only in a state of war or severe emergency, and then only with parliamentary authorisation and for a limited period (a maximum of 30 days), may some temporary restrictions on people’s rights be imposed. Yet we have seen with our own eyes that martial law has been imposed in a harsher form. Even in these circumstances, the term “martial law” is not used; instead, the government speaks only of a legally defined state of emergency. Therefore, the term “martial law” does not exist in the laws of the Islamic Republic, and its declaration has been entirely prohibited. This reflects the revolutionaries’ sensitivity to the misuse of martial law under the previous regime. Instead, other legal mechanisms have been provided for times of crisis; for example, the Supreme National Security Council can make decisions in a crisis that restrict citizens’ rights, such as imposing curfews or temporarily cutting communications. However, these decisions must also be approved by the Supreme Leader and subsequently reported to Parliament (although in practice many resolutions of the Supreme National Security Council remain confidential). It is worth noting that since the 1979 Revolution, the Iranian government has never officially declared either a state of emergency or martial law; even during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), when the country was engaged in a full-scale war, the government imposed only certain local restrictions, such as night-time blackouts in cities or the selection of routes for travel, rather than declaring a domestic state of emergency. This refusal to declare an official state of emergency has meant that parliamentary oversight of security measures has effectively been circumvented. However, the legal prohibition on declaring martial law does not mean that such a situation has never arisen. Constitutional law experts have stated that martial law can be imposed quietly, without issuing a notice. In other words, military and security forces may in practice take over police duties and restrict freedoms without calling it martial law. This can be seen at various points since the Revolution: the heavy presence of the IRGC and Basij in the streets, the unofficial imposition of night-time movement restrictions, numerous checkpoints and the armed control of thoroughfares are examples of quasi-martial-law measures implemented during periods of crisis without an official declaration. For example, in the summer of 1979, following clashes in Kurdistan and Turkmen Sahra, the IRGC imposed night-time movement restrictions in some cities without calling them martial law. Likewise, during the unrest of 2009 (the Green Movement) and 2019 (the protests over rising petrol prices), the government, by cutting off the internet, deploying large numbers of armed forces in the streets and setting up mobile checkpoints, effectively created an atmosphere resembling martial law, even though it never officially declared a state of emergency. 3. Checkpoints during crises and white, yellow and red alert situations A checkpoint is the deployment of military or law-enforcement units at transit points to stop and search vehicles and people. In ordinary circumstances, this is done on a limited basis—for example, at road-safety checkpoints or border crossings—but during political and security crises it increases sharply. The reason that “checkpoints are set up whenever there is a crisis or difficult conditions” is that the government seeks to prevent the organisation of protests or acts of sabotage by controlling movement and searching people and vehicles. In effect, extensive checkpoints and patrols are a deterrent tool for the authorities, enabling them to monitor and thwart any gathering, weapons-carrying or movement of agents involved in unrest. Moreover, the display of force through an armed presence in the streets itself instils fear among the public, which can prevent protests from spreading. As one military affairs expert has noted: “Setting up checkpoints on public thoroughfares, particularly by Basij forces, is nothing new, but specific events provide an excuse for their redeployment. The great majority of these checkpoints are established to control possible domestic unrest.” Historically, the presence of the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards in the streets has become more pronounced after major political events. For example, Basij checkpoints increased in cities after the student protests of 18 Tir 1378 [9 July 1999] and again after the widespread protests of 1388 [2009]. From a legal perspective, the duties of military and law-enforcement institutions are defined for different security situations. According to the IRGC’s domestic sources, four security situations are envisaged for internal conditions: white (normal), grey (minor unrest), yellow (extraordinary crisis) and red (acute crisis). The armed forces have different roles in each of these situations: • White status (normal conditions): In this situation, there are no signs of a threat to public order. The Law Enforcement Force (the police) is responsible for maintaining day-to-day security, while the Basij is primarily concerned with organising and training its forces and keeping them ready. If necessary, under normal conditions the Basij can conduct neighbourhood patrols and cooperate with the police on intelligence matters, but it does not usually play a direct role in suppression. The Army (ground, air and naval forces) is also occupied solely with external defence missions and combat training in normal conditions, and does not intervene in domestic security affairs (under the law, the Army does not intervene directly in political affairs or internal security except in particular wartime conditions). • Grey status (initial abnormal situation): In this state, signs of scattered unrest, strikes or limited protests begin to appear. The police gather the necessary information and increase surveillance. At this stage, the Basij is placed on alert and its organised units prepare to act if called upon. There is not yet any overt intervention by heavy military forces, but preparations are stepped up. • Yellow status (emergency/crisis): This status applies when unrest has become widespread and coordinated—for example, when there are large demonstrations, street disturbances, attacks on government premises or sporadic armed clashes in a city. In such circumstances, the Basij becomes actively involved. Its stated mission is to “confront crises and domestic disturbances in yellow status”. Basij forces operate in an organised manner under the command of the Law Enforcement Force, working to contain unrest and restore urban security. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC Ground Force) remains on full alert, ready to enter the scene if the crisis escalates further and it is ordered to do so. In effect, in yellow status, the police and the Basij are on the front line in confronting domestic unrest, while the IRGC remains in the background as a supporting force. The Army usually does not intervene directly even at this stage, since containing unrest is inherently the responsibility of the IRGC and the domestic security forces. • Red status (critical/acute): This is a further escalation of yellow status, in which the activities of forces opposed to the regime expand in an organised manner with the aim of overthrowing it. In other words, the country is facing a major security crisis or even civil or urban warfare. The historical example cited for red status is the situation in Tehran on 30 Khordad 1360 [20 June 1981], when the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran engaged in armed clashes with the Islamic Republic. In such a situation, under orders, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps acts directly alongside organised Basij forces. The country’s leadership or the Supreme National Security Council assigns the IRGC the task of restoring calm. Thus, in red status, the IRGC takes the leading role, with the Law Enforcement Force and the Basij operating under its command. Units of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army may also be called in, with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, if the situation worsens and heavier equipment is needed—for example, Army armoured units or aviation units may be deployed to suppress armed groups. Overall, however, in the Islamic Republic the primary responsibility for controlling domestic security crises lies with the IRGC and the Basij, while the Army plays a minor role in law-enforcement matters inside cities. This division of responsibilities dates back to the beginning of the Revolution: Imam Khomeini defined the IRGC as the guarantor of internal security and the Army as the defender of the borders. Therefore, during crises (yellow and red status), we see numerous checkpoints, armed Basij and IRGC patrols, and military control of cities. These checkpoints are used as one of the principal tools for containing a crisis: forces stationed there stop passing vehicles, inspect identity documents and cargo, and, if they suspect the presence of agents of insecurity or prohibited items (such as weapons, explosives or inciting leaflets), arrest people or seize their belongings. Officials believe these measures are necessary to ensure citizens’ safety; many people, however, see them as security being appropriated in the service of repression. As the Shargh newspaper put it in a headline: “Checkpoint or shooting point? Reckless shooting at citizens has created the impression that officers have broad powers to use firearms.” The following section examines the consequences of these quasi-martial-law controls and the cases of shooting at checkpoints. 4. The practical implementation of martial law (undeclared controls) and the number of victims at checkpoints Over the past 46 years, the Islamic Republic has carried out many measures and controls associated with martial law without officially declaring it. Whenever political and security crises have intensified, the country has been placed under heightened security and measures resembling martial law have been put into effect. These have included cutting or disrupting the internet and telecommunications, a widespread presence of riot police, setting up checkpoints at the entrances and exits of cities and in sensitive neighbourhoods, searching passing vehicles, conducting body searches of people in the streets, and even imposing night-time traffic restrictions (without publicly announcing a curfew). For example, during the Aban 1398 protests (triggered by rising petrol prices), the government effectively created conditions resembling martial law by cutting off the internet nationwide and deploying the Basij and the IRGC in the streets, leading to a severe crackdown on protesters. Likewise, during the nationwide protests of 1401 (the Woman, Life, Freedom movement), temporary checkpoints were set up in many cities, and plainclothes agents and Basij forces were stationed in public thoroughfares to disperse any gatherings immediately and prevent sound equipment or journalists from entering. These extra-legal controls have led many citizens to feel that “the Islamic Republic carries out all the controls of martial law unofficially”, without accepting legal responsibility for them. One serious consequence of setting up extensive checkpoints has been an increase in violent confrontations between armed officers and ordinary people. There have been numerous instances in which officers at checkpoints have fired at passing vehicles, killing or injuring innocent citizens. An important question is: how many people have been injured or killed in checkpoint operations over the past 46 years? No precise official figures are publicly available, because such incidents are often concealed or justified by government institutions. Nevertheless, numerous media and human rights reports have documented these fatal incidents. In recent years alone, several have received widespread attention: • Shooting at the Tarik-Darreh checkpoint in Hamadan (10 Tir 1403 / July 2024): Basij officers in a tourist area near Hamadan opened fire on a Nissan Roniz off-road vehicle that had apparently failed to obey an order to stop. Two young men, Alireza Karbasi and Mehdi Abaei, were killed, and a third, Mohammad Sabirizadeh, was seriously injured. The initial account by the Fars News Agency (affiliated with the IRGC) claimed that a report had been received of a small drone flying in the area, and that the officers had warned the occupants of the suspicious vehicle, who then fled. However, images showing bullet holes in the front and side of the vehicle indicated that the officers had fired directly into it without first firing warning shots into the air or at its tyres. The incident provoked a wave of anger among the people of Hamadan, and even the victims’ funeral became a scene of protest. The head of the Hamadan Armed Forces Judicial Organisation announced that three officers responsible had been prosecuted and arrested, but the outcome of their trial is still unclear. • Shooting at the Khomeyn checkpoint (Markazi Province) (26 Tir 1403 / July 2024): Just 16 days after the Hamadan incident, armed officers opened fire on two passing cars near a military facility in Khomeyn. In this mistaken shooting, four people from two families were killed: two young children (three-year-old Raha Sheikhi and nine-year-old Mohammad Hossein Sheikhi) and two adults (Mahboobeh Sheikhi and Farzaneh Heydari). The governor of Khomeyn confirmed the incident, saying that security forces at a military facility had become suspicious of the passing vehicles and fired at them, killing these people. The tragedy also received widespread attention. The Khomeyn prosecutor announced that a judicial case had been opened and those responsible for the shooting arrested, while the Markazi Province police commander attended the victims’ funeral and even described them as “martyrs”. Experience has shown, however, that in most cases, once public concern subsides, proceedings over such incidents move slowly and leniently, and usually end in light sentences—or the officers’ acquittal on the grounds that they mistook the situation. • In addition to these cases, dozens of others have occurred over the past decades. For example: the shooting by officers from Tehran’s Qolhak Police Station 124 at the riders of a suspicious motorcycle with an obscured number plate on 29 Khordad 1403, which killed one of the riders; the shooting by a police officer in the town of Nur on 2 Mordad 1403 to stop a passenger car, which left a 31-year-old woman named Arezou Badri seriously injured and paralysed. According to BBC Persian, the apparent offence was that the car had received a warning over improper hijab, and the police pursuit took place for this reason! Numerous shootings over the years in Sistan and Baluchestan Province at vehicles suspected of carrying smuggled fuel or Afghan migrants have also claimed lives (for example, in an incident in 1399 in Saravan County, a fuel-carrier’s vehicle was targeted and set alight, burning the driver and prompting protests). Or, in 1394, officers fired at a Pride car at a checkpoint in Izeh County, Khuzestan, killing a 17-month-old child, Setayesh Dashti, in her mother’s arms and causing an uproar. This painful list could go on, showing how checkpoints have turned into firing ranges, periodically leaving families bereaved. Who is answerable for the blood of the innocent that has been shed? Unfortunately, in most of these cases, government officials evade responsibility. Often, attempts are made to bring matters to a close by calling the victims “martyrs” and offering condolences to their families, in order to contain public anger. At best, the officers who fired are sent to a military court; but the courts usually impose no severe punishment, arguing that “the officer was acting in the course of duty and ensuring security”. In many cases, proceedings are closed or limited to the payment of blood money from public funds. In other words, there is no systematic and transparent accountability, and the victims’ families and the public rarely obtain the justice they expect. It is clear that this process breeds distrust and pent-up anger in society. 5. The Law on the Use of Firearms and Rules for Vehicle Searches – in Law and in Practice The Law on the Use of Weapons by the Armed Forces in Necessary Cases (passed in 1994) sets out the legal framework governing the use of firearms by the police, the Basij and other armed forces. Under Article 3 of this law, law-enforcement officers may use firearms only in ten specified cases. These include legitimate self-defence against an armed attack; saving the lives of people in danger when no other means of defence is possible; pursuing and arresting armed robbers, highwaymen and terrorists as they flee; preventing the escape of a dangerous prisoner; protecting sensitive sites and weapons depots; countering armed incursions across the country’s borders; and certain similar cases. Failure to obey a halt order, by itself, does not authorise officers to shoot, unless the conditions set out above have been established—for example, that the suspect is believed to have committed a serious crime. The law emphasises that even in these cases, officers may fire only when no other option is available, and must, wherever possible, follow the progressive use-of-force procedure. Note 1 to Article 3 requires a prior warning, such as a shot fired into the air, while Note 3 explicitly states that, where possible, officers must first fire into the air, then aim at the lower body, and only finally at the upper body. Article 7 of the law also stipulates that officers must, wherever possible, shoot at the legs, while Article 11 stresses that military and security forces must receive the necessary training in this area. Article 2 makes officers’ mental fitness and adequate training conditions of their service. In addition, the Criminal Procedure Code and the principles of the Constitution protect citizens’ privacy. Article 22 of the Constitution declares people’s dignity, life, property, homes and occupations inviolable, except as provided by law. Article 55 of the Criminal Procedure Code (passed in 2013) states that searching and inspecting people and their belongings without a judicial warrant is prohibited, except in cases of a crime committed in flagrante delicto or strong suspicion that a specific crime has been committed. Thus, searching vehicles at checkpoints without judicial authorisation is, in principle, unlawful. No officer has the right to search a citizen’s vehicle without a written or verbal order from a judicial authority; the mere presence of a checkpoint does not amount to general permission to search. In practice, however, personnel stationed at checkpoints usually search vehicles by relying on confidential resolutions of the Supreme National Security Council or orders from local officials, and drivers rarely manage to prevent these unlawful searches. Particularly in wartime or emergencies, security forces stop and search virtually any vehicle they choose, without obtaining an individual warrant—an act that contravenes the express provisions of the law. Citizens retain the right to complain, although proving their case in courts operating under the control of these same forces is difficult. This raises the question: how many shootings by officers at checkpoints have complied with these laws? Evidence suggests that many such shootings take place in violation of legal regulations. According to security analysts, “Contrary to what the law on the use of firearms stipulates, armed officers use military weapons with ease, and this is not limited to recent incidents.” In cases where drug traffickers or armed criminals have been shot, few police officers have faced reprimand; the problem, however, is that in many instances ordinary, innocent people have been shot simply because they failed to obey a halt order or because officers misidentified them. As legal experts have made clear, even wartime conditions do not justify indiscriminate shooting at civilians. “Officers have no right to apply the way they deal with foreign invaders to their own citizens, putting their lives and property at risk.” The laws governing war and emergencies against a foreign enemy never mean that shooting at the people of one’s own country is permissible. If an officer fails to observe these rules, their act constitutes intentional murder, and they must be dealt with under Articles 290 and 291 of the Islamic Penal Code. Nevertheless, judicial practice in Iran has shown that decisive action against offending officers is rare. To put it plainly, the Islamic Republic has not been held accountable for most of these cases, and the victims’ families generally do not obtain justice. Only in a few exceptional cases, under pressure from public opinion (or amid factional disputes within the establishment), has a trial been held, sometimes to appease the public. For example, in the case of the killing of 12-year-old Setayesh Qorayshi in 2006, after she was accidentally shot by the Basij, no clear ruling on the officer responsible was ultimately announced, despite the case receiving media attention, and the matter was left unresolved. Conclusion and recommendations Summary: The foregoing analysis shows that martial law in the classical sense is prohibited under Iran’s legal system. Yet, by circumventing this prohibition, the authorities use almost all the instruments of martial law whenever they see fit—from a heavy military presence in cities to setting up checkpoints and shooting those who break the rules. The official justification for these measures is to ensure national security and public order in times of crisis, but the way they are carried out and the cases in which they are applied show that people’s fundamental rights are violated in many instances, and an atmosphere of fear and intimidation is imposed on society. These actions, taken outside the legal framework, not only conflict with the Constitution and the country’s ordinary laws but have also severely undermined public trust in the armed forces and law-enforcement officers. As legal experts emphasise, the government’s most important duty is to protect citizens’ security and safeguard their lives and property; yet, particularly in wartime and during crises, the conduct of some security forces has itself become a source of insecurity and fear for citizens. When people see that even within their own country and in peacetime—or amid a war against a foreign enemy—they may be innocently shot by their own forces, it is natural for them to feel unsafe, disillusioned and angry. Lasting security can be achieved only through the rule of law and genuine accountability for security forces, not by creating an atmosphere of repression and fear. Why does the Islamic Republic not even abide by its own laws? One possible answer is that the government’s ideological-security-driven nature sometimes places the regime’s survival above the interests of upholding the law. When the rulers fear that unrest may threaten the foundations of the system, they give the forces of repression a completely free hand and turn a blind eye to their violations. In such an environment, a culture of impunity takes shape: officers feel they can do anything to instil fear in people, without facing serious repercussions later. This vicious cycle will continue as long as independent oversight bodies and a free media do not exist. But what should people inside the country and Iranians living abroad do? First and foremost, raising awareness is very important. Citizens should know their legal rights — they should know that searching a vehicle without a judicial warrant is illegal, and that an officer has no right to fire indiscriminately — so that, if they encounter such conduct, they can lodge a legal objection (however limited) or gather evidence afterwards. Recording and documenting violations (for example, secretly filming a checkpoint and the officers’ conduct, where possible) may prove effective in seeking justice in the future. Of course, directly confronting an armed officer at a checkpoint is not wise, and preserving one’s life comes first; but citizens can report violations safely to human rights organisations or independent media so that they are documented. Secondly, public opinion and civil society organisations abroad have an important role in putting pressure on the government to be held accountable. Iranians abroad can raise the profile of these incidents internationally and draw the attention of organisations such as Amnesty International or UN Special Rapporteurs on human rights, thereby increasing the cost to the Iranian government of domestic repression. They can also ask the governments of the countries where they live to raise cases of human rights violations by Iranian officials (including arbitrary shootings) in international forums. The use of international legal mechanisms — such as the principle of universal jurisdiction to prosecute human rights criminals — is another avenue pursued by some activists, who seek to bring those involved in these shootings to trial abroad. Ultimately, the fundamental solution is to demand the rule of law and accountability from those in power inside the country. Until the power structure is held accountable and offending forces are punished, there will be neither genuine security nor a restoration of public trust. The people of Iran have the right to enjoy security and freedom together: security ensured through the law and respect for citizens’ rights, not through the barrel of a gun at checkpoints. Achieving such a situation requires vigilance and unity within civil society, sustained pressure for legal reforms and, where necessary, support from international bodies for the legitimate demands of the Iranian people. Although this path is difficult, historical experience shows that no authoritarian government can rule forever by creating fear and terror. Sooner or later, the nation’s will for freedom and genuine security will find its way forward. Sources: - Wikipedia (Persian) — Definition of martial law and associated measures such as curfews and military courts. - Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran — Article 79: prohibition on imposing martial law and the possibility of imposing necessary restrictions, with the approval of Parliament, in emergencies, for a maximum of 30 days. - Law and Society Blog (Amirhossein Alinaghi) — “Martial Law and the Iranian Constitution”: emphasis on the prohibition on military involvement in civil affairs and the possibility of martial law being imposed unofficially. - WikiFiqh — “Basij” article: explanation of security situations (white, grey, yellow and red) and the duties of the Basij and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in each situation. - Shargh newspaper — “Checkpoint or Shooting Stop?” (12 Mordad 1404): examination of cases in which officers shot at vehicles at checkpoints after the “12-day Israel-Iran war”, and legal criticism of the practice by jurists. - Euronews (Persian) — Article dated 2 Mordad 1404: “Blind Shootings by Basij Officers: Providing Security or Creating Fear?” — containing details of shooting incidents in Hamadan and Khomeyn in Tir 1403, analysis of similar cases and criticism of failures to comply with the Law on the Use of Firearms. - Mizan News Agency / domestic legal websites — Legal provisions on vehicle searches, the prohibition on searches without a judicial warrant, and the conditions governing officers’ use of firearms under the law’s 10 permitted cases, including the requirement to warn and to use graduated force when firing. - Law on the Use of Firearms (adopted 1373) — Article 3 and its notes: permitted circumstances for firing (10 clauses) and the requirement for a prior warning and for shots to be fired below the waist; Article 7: requirement to shoot at the legs; Article 11: requirement to train officers. - Statements by jurists in Shargh — emphasis on the constitutional protection of citizens’ lives and property and the prohibition on extending the rules of war to one’s own citizens. - Social networks and public reports — documentation of incidents such as the shooting in Gholhak, Tehran; the shooting in Noor, Mazandaran (Arezou Badri); and incidents in Sistan and Baluchestan, which have been covered by domestic and international media. 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