The Transition Triangle (2): The Leader of the Transition; Why Does the Opposition Need ‘Operational Convergence’? S. Rouzbeh ۱۴۰۵/۰۶/۱۶ The role of transition leadership in connecting the people’s strength with expertise and ready-made plans for decision-making, coordination and implementation. S. Rouzbeh – If the people are the main force for change, and experts, programmes and ready-made plans make up the ‘pre-transition capital’, who is to connect these two forces to decision-making, coordination and implementation at the most critical moment? And can Iran be governed in the first hours and days after the Islamic Republic with several decision-making centres, several leaders and dozens of rival political groups? Iran In my previous article, I spoke of the ‘Transition Triangle’: the people, pre-transition capital and transition leadership. All three are necessary, and none is sufficient on its own. The people generate the force for change. Hundreds of experts can prepare plans for the economy, energy, the judiciary, security, the Central Bank and the administration of the country. But at the moment power is transferred, there must be a centre that can make decisions, accept responsibility, coordinate the various sectors, enjoy public acceptance and be held accountable for the results. This is where the ‘leader of the transition’ becomes important. The transition leader is not meant to own Iran’s future, nor to determine the country’s political system. Their mission is to take the country from the end of the Islamic Republic to a point where people can decide Iran’s political future through their votes, in safety and freedom. We did not devise this definition for Prince Reza Pahlavi. He himself has repeatedly described such a role for the transition period. He has spoken of a constituent assembly, free elections, a referendum and leaving the final decision to the people, and has emphasised that his aim is not to seize power permanently. So the central question is not whether there is an infallible leader. No such person exists. The question is what qualities a leader of the transition should have, and which existing figure comes closest to meeting those criteria. Public recognition, political experience, the ability to communicate with society inside and outside the country, familiarity with different forces, access to experts and ready-made plans, the ability to engage and communicate with governments and international institutions, negotiating skills and the capacity to make decisions in a crisis are among the most important qualities. Fame alone is not enough. Governing through a high-risk period requires more than popularity: experience, a network of contacts, an understanding of domestic and international players, and teams that have thought about the country’s future before the day of crisis arrives. This combination can be called ‘accumulated political capital’. It is from this perspective that Prince Reza Pahlavi should be assessed. He has been involved in Iranian politics for more than four decades, during which time he has been in contact with various governments, parliaments, think tanks and political figures. This experience alone does not make anyone a leader, but during a transition it is an asset that cannot be ignored. Moreover, his activity has not remained confined to speeches and political contacts. In recent years, expert projects and plans for the economy, security, energy, the administration of the country and emergency conditions have taken shape around him. The ‘Iran Prosperity Project’, followed by the announcement of the ‘Transition System’, is part of this effort to prepare for the day after. This connects directly to the first side of the Transition Triangle: ‘pre-transition capital’. After the fall of the Islamic Republic, the country cannot only then begin deciding how the Central Bank should be run, how public services should continue, what the police should do, how the borders should be secured or how the administrative apparatus should prevent the country from collapsing. At that moment, there is no opportunity to design everything from scratch. That is why the leader of the transition cannot simply be a political figure; they must be able to connect existing expertise with decision-making and implementation. The question of ultimate responsibility also matters here. During the transition, there can be advisory councils, expert groups and oversight bodies, but in a moment of crisis it must be clear who is responsible for coordination and who makes the final decision. Several equally powerful decision-making centres could themselves become part of the crisis. This is where the need for a clear focal point for the transition becomes meaningful. But another misunderstanding must also be set aside. Convergence does not mean that our beliefs become one. A republican and a constitutionalist do not need to become monarchists, and a monarchist is not obliged to abandon their beliefs either. Disagreements over a republic, a monarchy, the economy, centralisation or decentralisation, and dozens of other issues must be resolved in a free Iran and by the people’s vote. What is needed today is not ‘ideological convergence’ but ‘operational agreement’. That means a temporary agreement on preserving Iran’s territorial integrity, security and the continuity of essential services; preventing chaos; upholding the rule of law; and bringing the country to a point where the people can freely choose their future system of government. In such an agreement, no political current is required to set aside in advance the future it wants. All disagreements can remain; the only thing that must be shared is the path through the transition. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has also repeatedly distinguished between leading the transition and determining the final form of government. He has said that the people must choose between a republic and a monarchy, and that the transition’s mission will end with the formation of institutions arising from the people’s vote. Therefore, accepting him as the leader of the transition does not necessarily mean choosing a monarchy. A republican can vote for a republic while also believing that Reza Pahlavi is the most suitable available option for coordinating the transition. Likewise, a monarchist must accept that if the people choose a republic in a free election, the result belongs to the people. Leadership of the transition is a mission, not a decision on the form of the future government. This mission must be temporary, and its limits and endpoint must be clear from the outset. But the temporary nature of power does not remove the need for a leader. Alongside experience and a plan, there is another factor that cannot be ignored: social capital. The question is not only who considers themselves ready to lead. We must also ask whose call the public responds to. In Iran’s recent protests, people in different cities responded to Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s calls, and his name was heard at the gatherings. Abroad, too, hundreds of thousands of Iranians took to the streets at gatherings organised in response to his calls. These events are not formal elections, and we cannot conclude from them that all Iranians share the same view. But they do point to a political reality: today, he has a visible capacity to mobilise and a discernible level of social capital. Prince Reza Pahlavi himself has also said that people have called upon him and asked him to accept responsibility. If an individual or movement believes there is a more suitable option to lead the transition, the criteria for comparison are clear. What is that option’s track record? How much capacity does it have to coordinate? What plan has it presented for the day after? What expert network and domestic and international connections does it have at its disposal? And, most importantly, how visible is its social capital in society? The way is open to every alternative. Any option can present itself to society and be assessed by these same criteria. But merely opposing Reza Pahlavi and his team is no practical substitute for addressing the question of leadership during the transition. If the final decision about the future system will in any case be put to a popular vote, what exactly is at stake in opposing an interim leader whose role is to lead the country to that very ballot box? This is a question the opposition must answer. Under the current circumstances, among the opposition’s public and well-known figures, I do not see anyone else who simultaneously has, at this level, a track record of several decades of political activity, public recognition, international connections, an expert network, a plan for the emergency period, a formal declaration of readiness to lead the transition, and visible social capital. Of course, no leader or president is immune to mistakes, and constructive and reasoned criticism must be possible; that is what freedom means. When some of his supporters acted wrongly, he criticised them and said that if they committed a crime, they must answer for their actions. Nor does he close the way to any of the other alternatives. But politics is not only about opposition; it also entails the responsibility to offer an alternative solution. This is where the three sides of the ‘Transition Triangle’ meet. The people provide the force for change and legitimacy. The pre-transition capital prepares experts, plans and a roadmap. And the leader of the transition must be able to turn these two assets into coordination, decisions and implementation. So the main question is no longer simply who opposes the Islamic Republic. The more important question is: who is better prepared for the day after? And if the forces seeking an end to the Islamic Republic cannot reach an operational agreement, before the moment of crisis arrives, on a central figure, a clear responsibility and a temporary path towards a free vote by the people, what guarantee is there that victory over the Islamic Republic will not turn into a crisis of power and failure in the transition? To be continued… Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/archive-63898ab2-638e-04c8-2ad3-d9bab94eac85 Please credit the author and link to this edition.