Who Benefits from the Islamic Republic’s Survival? From Moscow and Beijing to Hesitant European Capitals and Neighbours S. Rouzbeh ۱۴۰۵/۰۱/۱۰ S. Rouzbeh examines why Europe and NATO act cautiously towards the Islamic Republic, which countries benefit from its survival, and why the world prioritises containing the conflict over decisive action. The article contrasts human-rights rhetoric with the calculations of energy security, trade and regional stability. S. Rouzbeh – The war that began on 9 Esfand 1404, equivalent to 28 February 2026, was not merely a confrontation between Tehran, Washington and Tel Aviv. It quickly became a test for Europe, Britain, NATO and Iran’s neighbours. In public, everyone spoke of ‘de-escalation’, ‘protecting civilians’ and ‘returning to diplomacy’. But behind these polished words lay a cold truth: for most governments, what matters first is not the suffering of the Iranian people, but energy security, freedom of navigation, containing inflation, market stability and preventing the war from spreading. In its conclusions of 29 Esfand 1404, equivalent to 19 March 2026, the European Council also spoke of ‘the Iranian people’s right to determine their own future’, while the same text emphasised Europe’s energy security, supply chains, migration and internal security. This duality is the key to understanding how Europe and its allies are behaving towards Iran today. Three central questions therefore confront us: Why do Europe and NATO act cautiously towards the Islamic Republic, despite all their human-rights claims? Which countries benefit directly or indirectly from the regime’s survival? And why, when thousands of Iranians were being killed, did the world take no decisive action, while now it is chiefly trying to contain a fire that might spread to its own home? These are not merely political questions. They concern the relationship between morality and self-interest in global politics; and their answers offer a bleak but realistic picture of today’s world. The first answer is that Europe is not necessarily defending the Islamic Republic; rather, it fears its uncontrolled collapse. This fear should be taken seriously, because it is reflected in official documents too. In addition to calling for de-escalation, the European Council on 29 Esfand 1404 / 19 March 2026 specifically spoke of the war’s impact on economic stability, energy prices, supply chains, migration and internal security. On 7 Farvardin 1405 / 27 March 2026, the G7 also called for attacks on civilians to stop, but in the same statement it stressed the need to restore safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and contain disruption to energy and global trade chains. This means that the West’s official language in this crisis is more the language of calculation than of conscience. This calculation also contains an evident contradiction. On the one hand, repression and killings in Iran are condemned. On 26 Esfand 1404, equivalent to 16 March 2026, the Council of the European Union sanctioned a further 16 individuals and three entities for their role in repressing the January protests, saying that this crackdown had resulted in ‘thousands of civilian victims’. On the other hand, during the regional crisis, the same Europe placed the greatest weight in its calculations on energy security, calm in the markets, migration and its own internal stability. In other words, the suffering of the Iranian people is acknowledged, but only insofar as it does not conflict with Europe’s direct interests. This is where we must write plainly: at decisive moments, the free world usually looks first into the mirror of its own interests. NATO is no exception to this logic. The alliance was established primarily for the collective defence of its members, not for automatic intervention in every regional war. On 6 Farvardin 1405, equivalent to 26 March 2026, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said that missiles launched from Iran towards Turkey had been intercepted, and stressed that NATO would defend ‘every inch of Allied territory’. This position clearly shows that NATO views the crisis through the lens of its members’ security, not the freedom of the Iranian people. NATO did not stay out because its heart went out to Iranians; it stayed out because its mission, remit and interests are defined elsewhere. In substance, Britain is no different from the rest of Europe. London endorsed the protection of civilians and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz in the G7’s joint statement, but that same shared position shows that the chief concern is disruption to global energy and the economy. For Britain, as for many European governments, the central question is not how much the people of Iran have suffered, or are suffering. The main question is what this war will do to energy prices, economic growth and domestic stability. This is the same tightrope-walking policy that seeks both to stand alongside allies and to keep the cost of war as far from home as possible. In this approach, human rights matter, but only so long as they do not harm electricity bills, ports or market calm. Spain, however, is an illuminating example, because it lays bare the gap between moral rhetoric and practical interests. On 5 Farvardin 1405, equivalent to 25 March 2026, Pedro Sánchez recalled the experience of Iraq in the Congress of Deputies, spoke of the catastrophe of war, regional instability, the growth of terrorism, the migration crisis and rising fuel prices, and openly distanced himself from joining a new war. At the same time, in Spanish domestic politics, right-wing opponents accused him of hypocrisy and pointed to exports of dual-use items to Iran. Public reports on Spanish trade statistics say that more than €1.3 million worth of dual-use items were exported to Iran in 2024 and the first half of 2025, including items related to explosives. Here, we must be precise: what has been documented is the export of dual-use items, not proof of the direct sale of weapons of war for this particular conflict. But even this is enough to show how readily moral slogans in Europe soften when interests and trade are at stake. Meanwhile, Russia and China have been, and remain, the most important direct beneficiaries of the Islamic Republic’s survival. Moscow sees Tehran as an anti-Western partner, a regional lever and a geopolitical asset. Beijing, too, views Iran as a source of energy, a partner under sanctions and a useful irritant to the American-led order. Yet even these two do not want an endless war. They do not want Iran to collapse into chaos either, because complete instability could make energy and trade routes costly for them as well. Russia and China’s formula is simple: Iran should endure, but not collapse; be weak, but not burn; cause trouble for the West, but not reach an uncontrollable explosion. This kind of support is not political solidarity with an ally; it is the preservation of a geopolitical instrument. Turkey belongs in a different category. Ankara fears the costly collapse of the Islamic Republic more than it benefits from its survival. Reuters reported that on 5 Farvardin 1405 / 25 March 2026, Turkey was relaying messages between Tehran and Washington, and had tried to mediate even before the war. The same report says that three Iranian missiles had also been intercepted by NATO air defences over Turkish territory since the start of the war. Turkey is a NATO member, borders Iran, is affected by the energy crisis, and any major regional instability could wound both its economy and its border security. Ankara is therefore not a supporter of the Islamic Republic; it supports manageable stability. This is a crucial distinction, because in hasty analyses the two are constantly conflated. Turkey is more opposed to a vacuum than it is in favour of the regime’s survival. In addition, Turkey: 1. In 2025, Turkey ranked fourth in the world, after France, Spain and the United States, attracting around 64 million tourists. 2. The country’s annual tourism-industry revenue has reached a record $65 billion, making it a mainstay of its economic stability. 3. With around 2.5 million trips a year, Iranians are consistently among Turkey’s top five visitor nationalities and sources of revenue. 4. Analyses confirm that a free Iran, with its historical potential, would be capable of attracting half of this revenue ($30 billion). Pakistan, too, has entered the fray according to much the same logic. In reports published on 8 and 9 Farvardin 1405, corresponding to 28 and 29 March 2026, the Associated Press wrote that Islamabad had become an unexpected intermediary between Tehran and Washington, and that diplomatic ambition was not the only reason for its role: economic challenges, energy security and fear of the war spreading had also pushed it towards containing the crisis. The recent meetings in Islamabad, attended by the foreign ministers of Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, make the same point: Pakistan fears the war spreading, disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, energy costs and turmoil spilling over into its own neighbourhood. Islamabad’s efforts to secure an agreement are therefore less an expression of love for Tehran than a response to the fear of a regional blaze. The countries of this region watched from the sidelines as long as they saw the costs from a distance; now that the spark is nearing their own storehouses, their diplomatic language has suddenly grown more urgent. As for the neighbouring Arab countries, but on a broader scale, the Arab states of the Gulf have for years sought to keep the fire away from their own homes, because any escalation of the war offered them no benefit. They have been, and remain, interested in the regime’s survival for the following reasons: – The UAE: By attracting 17 million tourists and earning $50 billion, it has effectively taken over Iran’s commercial and aviation standing in the region. – Qatar: By drawing without rival on the shared gas field and investing in the world’s best airline, it has claimed as its own immense wealth that belonged to a shared geography. Unpacking the beneficiaries of the current situation: if we look honestly at the map, Iran’s present isolation is a ‘golden opportunity’ for many global actors: 1. Neighbours (rivals): In the absence of a free Iran, all the investment, tourists and transit routes have flowed towards Dubai, Doha and Istanbul. According to the principle of the Balance of Power, regional countries would rather see Iran caught up in domestic crises and international isolation, so that it cannot become the leading power (Hegemon). An isolated Iran means: – The oil and gas market in the hands of competitors. – Tourists and investment drawn in by neighbouring countries. – A historical and civilisational rival weakened. 2. Global powers: They benefit from massive arms sales to the region (under the pretext of threats) and from controlling energy prices because of Iran’s complete absence from the modern market. 3. The result: In this balance, almost all international beneficiaries profit from Iran’s potential; the only great loser of this isolation is the Iranian people, deprived of their share of national wealth and their place in the world, while their income is spent on proxy forces and so on. Today, those same countries are paying a heavy price for years of delay, complacency and hope that the Islamic Republic could be contained: greater insecurity. Their miscalculation was to postpone the danger, not to resolve it at its root. Amid all these calculations, the people of Iran become almost invisible. When lives were being lost in the streets, prisons and detention centres, the world’s response was limited, slow and full of reservations. The European Union adopted several packages of sanctions, but these measures were neither strong enough to halt the machinery of repression nor early and sustained enough to raise the regime’s costs decisively. Now that the war is tied to global energy security and the economy, everyone has suddenly become active. This is the bitter, real picture of today’s world: the blood of Iranians alone was not enough to move many capitals, but the Strait of Hormuz and the price of oil were. This reality cannot be glossed over with polite evasions. Had the same determination now being shown to protect shipping and contain energy prices been brought to bear when young Iranians were being shot, perhaps the region and the world would not today be forced to pay such a heavy bill. It is in this context that Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s recent message takes on a particular meaning. In a speech on 8 Farvardin 1405, corresponding to 28 March 2026, at CPAC, he said, ‘The Islamic Republic in its entirety must go’ and ‘The final blow to the regime will be delivered by the Iranian people.’ Reuters reported that same day that he warned that making a deal with the Islamic Republic’s current leaders would merely defer the threat to the future, and called for the regime not to be thrown a ‘lifeline’. Regardless of who agrees or disagrees with this position, it highlights one point: even in the eyes of part of the opposition, Iran’s freedom is not going to be handed to it on a platter by any foreign power. Governments do their own calculations, and unless the Iranian people themselves untie this knot, others will either make a deal or leave the crisis unresolved. This part of the story becomes sharper when we look at the Islamic Republic’s financial and operational networks. On 6 Esfand 1404, corresponding to 25 February 2026, the US Treasury Department sanctioned networks that, according to Washington, helped with the illegal sale of oil, shadow fleets, money-laundering of oil revenues, and the procurement of materials and equipment for Iran’s weapons and missile programmes. This means that for years the Islamic Republic has relied not only on divisions in global policy, but also on financial loopholes, front companies and hidden routes to buy its survival and export instability. So the disaster was not only that the world pursued its own interests; it was also that the regime used the Iranian people’s money to pursue this same game of self-interest on a more destructive scale. Meanwhile, some in the region, through either tolerance, endless mediation or prioritising short-term calm, effectively gave this cycle more time to continue. This is where we can speak more plainly. When the lives of Iranians were being taken in the streets and prisons, the world did not do enough to stop the killing machine. Sanctions came late and were limited, pressure was fragmented, and many governments hoped they could manage the crisis through some kind of compromise. Now those same governments face a costlier war, a more turbulent market and a less secure region. This is the price of ignoring the reality of the Islamic Republic. Yet amid all this bitterness, one point must be stated more clearly than ever: as Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi said, Iran’s freedom will ultimately be won by the Iranian people, through their courage. Neither Brussels, NATO, London, Islamabad, Ankara nor any other capital will free Iran out of affection or goodwill. They pursue their own interests. If this dark chapter is to be brought to a close, it is the people of Iran who will do so through perseverance, organisation, the leadership of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, and their own courage. Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/archive-6c4625d0-d63a-37a0-9b85-2979959a95eb Please credit the author and link to this edition.