Drawing the Line at the Last Moment: How Do We Turn the Discontented and the Opposition into Informed, United Protesters, So the Regime Cannot Buy Time Again by Sowing Division? S. Rouzbeh ۱۴۰۴/۱۰/۰۹ S. Rouzbeh examines how to turn discontent into collective action, resist the regime’s efforts to divide society, build unity around shared principles, and encourage members of the security forces and armed forces not to take part in repression. S. Rouzbeh – “Can one still be discontented and remain neutral when the country’s fate is at boiling point?”, “Is being ‘opposition’ without collective action merely a psychological outlet, or a real step towards change?”, “Why is a dictatorship not afraid of ‘anger’, but terrified of ‘organised anger’?” And the harder question: “At this turning point, where do the armed forces, the rank and file of the FARAJA and the army stand—beside the people or behind the wall of command?” Strike and protest by Tehran’s shopkeepers, Dey 1404 On the outskirts of the city, an exhausted worker and citizen, worn down after a gruelling day, watches a video of a protester being confronted. Three voices stir within him: the silent discontented voice that says, “Nothing ever changes”; the informed opposition voice that understands, “The problem is not one mistake; the problem is a system”; and the potential protester’s voice, whispering, “If I stay silent today, tomorrow it will be my turn.” The dictatorship devotes all its security resources to stifling the third voice, because the moment that endangers despotism is precisely when scattered, discontented people become informed protesters acting in solidarity. In Iran today, a “discontented person” is someone worn down by economic pressure, humiliation, discrimination and corruption, but who has not yet reached the point of collective action. At home, in taxis and at work, they talk about rising prices and injustice, but in their mind fear still prevails: fear of the cost, of being alone, of having no one to turn to. The “opposition” is one step further along: they have understood that the problem is not just the price of the dollar, gold, coins and foreign currency, but the relationship between power and the people. The opposition has an analysis; they know why the law has, in many cases, been turned from a shield for citizens into a club wielded by the government, and they understand that corruption is not accidental but structural. A “protester”, however, is someone who turns this understanding into action: taking part in protests, strikes, sit-ins, civil disobedience, or any other visible action that carries a cost. That is exactly why the regime tries to keep people between discontent and opposition, preventing them from reaching the stage of collective protest. Meanwhile, the bazaar is not alone, and the country is more than its bazaar. If shopkeepers and trade associations under pressure are raising their voices in protest, it is the duty of all sections of society to make their support visible and practical: women, workers, teachers, pensioners, drivers, farmers, students, and employees of the oil, gas and petrochemical industries. When voices are raised together and in solidarity, silencing one voice will mean silencing an entire nation, and the cost of repression for the government will multiply and become uncontrollable. What does the government want? Its main aim is to change the battlefield: from “the people against despotism” to “the people against one another”. When disagreements are magnified, when each group sees the other as an enemy, and when narratives are tainted with labelling and vilification, collective action breaks apart from within. This is where cyber networks and the propaganda machine play a vital role: creating divisive narratives, assassinating people’s character, and turning political disagreement into enmity. In such an atmosphere, every discussion is quickly polarised, every ceremony risks becoming a confrontation, and every gathering can be turned into an internal clash by a single spark. This is exactly what the government wants: for the movement to become caught up in exhausting disputes instead of focusing on its shared goal. The tensions seen on the sidelines of some symbolic ceremonies and memorials in recent years, the disagreements at the Alikordi ceremony in Mashhad, and those involving Narges Mohammadi, or more recently Taraneh Alidoosti, along with the widespread attacks on Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi and his family, and the threats, and so on, warn us that the project of fomenting discord is not confined to the internet; it is carried out on the ground, too. It takes only a few provocateurs to turn a scene of mourning and solidarity into an argument and verbal confrontation. Then the same images are pumped through social networks so that the conclusion becomes: “See? They can’t even get along with one another.” Here, the antidote is a simple question, but a deadly one for propaganda: Who benefits from this narrative? Any narrative that undermines solidarity and fuels despair, whether through ignorance or under cyber direction, ultimately serves the security think tank. Even in the streets, the regime tries to divert people from the struggle by sending in the Basij and plainclothes agents disguised as protesters. After that, it wears people down, then its forces divide them in the streets and at intersections, arresting and repressing them in small groups. Anger without a purpose will achieve nothing. What do the people want? The answer is not complicated: security without humiliation, bread without corruption, freedom without fear, and law without force. But there is one vital condition for achieving these demands: unity around the minimum, rather than a battle over the maximum. Society does not need to become of one mind today about the final form of the future system. It is enough to unite around basic principles: an end to violence and executions, equal rights for all citizens, the separation of religion and state, and the people’s right to vote freely and determine their future. The dictatorship fears this shared minimum, because it makes an alliance possible. In cities and streets, people are chanting Reza Pahlavi because they know that unity and agreement around a clear focal point for victory and transition are essential to their success. The role of the armed forces and the rank and file of the FARAJA and the army is not a matter of window dressing; it is decisive. A large proportion of the repressive forces are themselves under economic and psychological pressure. Many members of the special units come from deprived provinces, are kept in barracks, are cut off from real contact with the people, and are fed a propaganda bubble that leads them to see the people as “the enemy”. By contrast, administrative staff, police stations and service departments, whose personnel deal with the public every day, are more exposed to doubt and questioning, because they experience the same hardships: rising prices, rent and an uncertain future. If the movement is to endure, it needs to draw a shrewd distinction: between the command and those ordering repression, on the one hand, and the rank and file who can be won over, on the other. Blind hatred and collective blame push wavering members of the forces towards the government. What must people do to sustain the process? First, turn passive discontent into informed opposition through precise discussion, raising awareness and avoiding rumours. Second, do not leave protesters on their own: provide media support, defend prisoners, and expose fabricated cases and lies. Third, diversify tactics: the regime has experience in suppressing street protests, but it is worn down by networks of civil disobedience, targeted strikes, boycotts of government spectacles and everyday acts of resistance. Fourth, take care with language: every sentence that burns a bridge of trust does exactly what the cyber operatives want. What is the duty of the rank and file? At least one principle: do not take part in repression. Do not shoot, do not assist, do not sign, do not report, and stand against unlawful orders. These are not merely “individual decisions”; they break a cog in the machinery of repression. The more this machine is filled with doubt and fractures, the higher the cost of repression and the greater the possibility of transition. Alongside this, society must make clear: there will be justice, but not blind, collective revenge. Trials should target those who ordered and carried out the principal crimes, not everyone who could have stood with the people but now wants a way back. The conclusion is this: today the regime is using two tools to buy time—repression and division. If we wear down repression through diverse forms of action and social support, but fail to take division seriously, the same cycle will repeat: a wave, repression, despair, retreat, and a fresh opportunity for plunder and for rebuilding the security networks. This time, we must understand that solidarity is not a slogan; it is a means of survival for the movement. And a few final questions that should remain before our eyes like red lights: If we become caught up in internal conflicts again, who benefits? If the discontented grow suspicious of the protesters, and the protesters see all the forces as a single, uniform enemy, who gains time? If the lines are not clearly drawn and the wavering ranks of the forces see no hope for the future, in which direction will they be pushed? And if we are not vigilant today, will we not once again face the same regime, now more bloated and more ruthless, which this time, with even more plundered money, has made its repression more professional? Iran’s escape from dictatorship will come not through individual heroics, but by turning the discontented into informed opponents, opponents into responsible protesters, and protesters into a united national force. This is the very path the autocracy fears, because it sees its end in that very “togetherness” and unity around a shared cause that the people cry out for. Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/archive-919f4952-4d7f-49e0-ec8f-3057f21bce60 Please credit the author and link to this edition.