When Reality Recedes, the Image Moves Forward S. Rouzbeh ۲۸ اسفند ۱۴۰۴ In modern warfare, battles are fought both on the ground and in the realm of perception. S. Rouzbeh examines how fabricated images and exaggerated claims can reveal the widening gap between military reality and official narratives, particularly in the case of the Islamic Republic. When Reality Recedes, the Image Moves Forward On psychological warfare, fabricated images and the divide between the battlefield and the narrative S. Rouzbeh In war, it is not only missiles, drones and warships that act. Images act, words act, narratives act. Every major conflict unfolds simultaneously on two fronts: the operational front and the front of perception. On one, infrastructure, command and military capability are targeted; on the other, the minds of audiences, public opinion, supporters and decision-making bodies. For this reason, psychological warfare is an inseparable part of modern war. But there is a serious difference between shaping a narrative and blatant fabrication. All governments and parties to a conflict try to highlight their achievements, conceal their defeats and create a favourable picture of their position. Yet not all resort to crude image-making, baseless claims and symbols that are quickly exposed as hollow to the same extent. This difference must be sought not only in political ethics, but even more in each side’s relationship with the reality on the ground. The central question is this: why, when under military and security pressure, does the Islamic Republic still resort to exaggerated displays, fabricated images and grandiose boasts? Why, at the very moment when more explanation and persuasion are needed, does official language turn towards threats, exaggeration and the creation of an imaginary picture? The answer lies in the gap between the battlefield and the narrative. The greater the distance between what is actually happening and what the official apparatus wants to show, the greater the need to bridge that distance. When a political or military structure has been hit, some of its deterrent capacity has been eroded, its command has been damaged or its control over events has diminished, preserving the image of authority becomes vital. In such circumstances, propaganda is no longer merely an auxiliary tool; it becomes a cover for real deficiencies. This is where fabricated imagery takes on meaning. The imaginary image of an enemy warship sinking, a claim of a major victory without clear supporting evidence, or exaggerated narratives of ‘complete control of the battlefield’ are, in essence, attempts to compensate for something that has not been achieved in reality. In other words, when a symbolic success cannot be secured on the battlefield, an artificial representation of it is created. At this point, propaganda goes beyond displaying power and becomes a substitute for power. By contrast, we must acknowledge that the United States and Israel also engage in psychological warfare. They too construct narratives, choose their words, highlight some images and omit others, and interpret military operations within the political framework they prefer. But the difference is that, in many cases at least, this narrative-building rests on a foundation of evidence from the field, verifiable data, real images and assessments that can be followed up. In other words, their propaganda generally builds on an achievement rather than filling the void left by one. This is not merely a difference in style of expression; it is a difference in position. An actor with the upper hand on the battlefield is usually less compelled to prove itself through crude, childish images. When intelligence data, satellite imagery, media reports and military assessments can be used to demonstrate the outcome of an attack, blatant fabrication is more of a liability than a tool. Under such circumstances, exposure of a lie can erode political and media credibility. For the Islamic Republic, by contrast, the issue is not only persuading an external audience. Much of this bluster and image-making is aimed at a domestic audience. These productions are not made for the United States and Israel; they are made for its own base, loyal forces, the apparatus of repression and even a society over which the government still wants to maintain psychological control. In this sense, propaganda is not intended merely to frighten the enemy; it is meant to contain doubt at home, sustain the morale of its own ranks and prevent the image of authority from collapsing. For this reason, bluster should not be understood simply as a sign of confidence. In many cases, it intensifies precisely when inner anxiety has grown. A loud voice does not always come from a position of strength. Sometimes it comes from a structure that has begun to crack, with the official apparatus trying to cover the fissures with slogans, images and threats before they become more visible. Another distinction matters here: the distinction between the capacity to disrupt and the capacity to prevail. A government or military force may still be able to strike, impose costs, cause disruption or keep the situation inflamed, but this does not mean it has strategic superiority. The ability to cause trouble is no substitute for the ability to prevail. Whenever proving victory requires more and more imaginary images, one can infer that the reality on the ground is not sufficiently favourable to carry the narrative on its own. For this reason, the main question is not who engages in psychological warfare and who does not. Almost everyone does. The question is whether one side frames its narrative around achievements on the battlefield, while the other, because of eroded or insufficient achievements, is forced to turn to visual substitutes, imaginary symbols and fragile exaggerations. The narrower the real battlefield becomes, the noisier the battle of images grows. In the case of the Islamic Republic, this growing noise can also be understood as a sign of anxiety. A regime that increasingly has to rely on grand images, maximalist claims and symbolic displays is in fact trying to bridge the gap between what it is and what it needs to appear to be. And that gap is itself one of the important signs of political and propagandistic exhaustion. In the end, perhaps the whole situation can be summed up in one proposition: whenever reality no longer comes to the aid of the official narrative, the image is rushed onto the scene more quickly. Where there is no upper hand in reality, the need for victory in the image grows. And it is precisely at this point that we can understand why some governments produce victory in posters and videos more than they achieve it on the battlefield. Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/archive-a7acb413-2079-dc31-76c1-7356cbe82a7f Please credit the author and link to this edition.