What fate awaits a government that massacres its own people if it acquires nuclear weapons? S. Rouzbeh ۱۴۰۴/۱۱/۱۳ S. Rouzbeh asks what risks arise when nuclear weapons are placed in the hands of a government that represses its own citizens, with opaque decision-making and few credible checks. The danger, the article argues, is not only the possibility of a nuclear strike but also the impunity such weapons could confer, the risk of miscalculation, and the immense human cost illustrated by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. S. Rouzbeh – When we talk about the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme, the issue is not just the enrichment percentage and the number of centrifuges. The main question is this: what kind of system will have this instrument in its hands, and what ethical, legal and institutional checks does that system have? A weapon is not inherently good or bad; it is like a knife that can cut bread in the kitchen or take a life in the street. A rope, too, can secure a load or tighten around a throat. The difference is not determined by the ‘instrument’ but by the ‘hand that holds it’. And this is the point at which the Islamic Republic’s nuclear dossier ceases to be a technical debate and becomes a political and moral question. Ali Khamenei visits an exhibition of nuclear achievements / June 2023 Here is the fundamental question: a government that has shown on its own streets that it will put the lives of its citizens at the lowest price to ensure its political survival—if one day it acquires a weapon capable of destroying a city in a matter of minutes, by what logic will it make decisions in a moment of international crisis? This article does not say that the button will ‘definitely’ be pressed. The issue is ‘risk’; it is ‘the capacity for restraint’. The world has also dealt with governments that possess nuclear weapons and have never used them. But the difference is that those governments have generally had checks: a free press, political competition, accountable institutions and crisis-management mechanisms. The question is: where are these checks in the Islamic Republic, and how credible are they? A few key questions before drawing any conclusions 1) Is widespread violence against citizens a sign that ethical and institutional checks on decision-making are weak? 2) Does possessing a bomb mean it will be used, or is it chiefly a tool for threats, blackmail and securing impunity? 3) In a system where decision-making is concentrated in a small, security-minded and opaque circle, how much higher is the likelihood of miscalculation? 4) If the government feels that it is approaching ‘the end of the line’, who and what institution can act as a check? 5) If accounts and statistics inside the country cannot be independently verified, how can the world rely on ‘ethical commitments’ or ‘political assurances’? 1) The issue is not just the bomb; it is ‘impunity’ Many analyses get stuck in a simple binary: bomb means use or non-use. But the principal danger is not necessarily an explosion. The greater danger is ‘nuclear impunity’: reaching a level of threat at which the government believes it can repress at lower cost, create crises more boldly, and make the other side back down in its calculations. This is where the bomb can turn from ‘defensive deterrence’ into ‘offensive deterrence’: not to prevent war, but to impose one’s will, raise the ceiling of threats and provide cover for riskier behaviour. In such circumstances, even if the button is never pressed, its shadow can hold the region and the people of Iran hostage. 2) Why are the Islamic Republic’s checks in doubt? This must be said plainly. The Islamic Republic’s main problem is not that it lacks ‘slogans’ or a ‘fatwa’. The problem is that its decision-making structure is closed, security-oriented and weakly accountable. When there is no free press, public oversight or genuine political competition, mistakes are not corrected; they are concealed. When the truth becomes dangerous, it is buried by cutting communications, putting pressure on families, tampering with case files and managing the narrative. Even if someone does not wish to go into political detail, one simple principle remains: in closed systems, major decisions are made by small circles. Information is selectively presented. Critics are removed. The result is a higher risk of ‘miscalculation’. And in the nuclear dossier, miscalculation means catastrophe. 3) The human weight of violence: when a number is the size of a city To understand what ‘the button’ means, it is enough to look at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In Hiroshima, around 70,000 people were killed on that day, and by the end of 1945 the total number of victims is estimated at around 140,000. In Nagasaki, too, around 40,000 people died that day, and total casualties by the end of 1945 are estimated at around 70,000. These figures count only the dead, not waves of burns, cancer, disability and the psychological devastation of several generations. This comparison is not intended to equate the events. It is meant to show the human scale of decisions made without institutional brakes. When a power, in a single moment, puts a number in place of a human being, from that moment on the issue is no longer just politics; it is the moral capacity of a system. Now place this perspective alongside reports of a bloody crackdown in Iran. Citing documents it has examined, Iran International has reported more than 36,500 people killed in the two-day crackdown of 8 and 9 January, and has itself stressed that, if confirmed, this could be one of the deadliest two-day massacres on record. At the same time, The Guardian has referred to estimates of more than 30,000 and emphasised the difficulty of independent verification in a security-controlled environment. But the main point is this: in crackdowns of this kind, the number of wounded and injured is usually higher than the number of those killed. And when the security apparatus takes control of the internet, hospitals, the media and the narrative, it does not destroy the truth; it merely delays its arrival. This very mechanism of concealment is itself a sign. Iran International has also reported that the Supreme National Security Council instructed the media to repeat only official figures and to refrain from independent reporting and speaking with families. Let us now put this proposition precisely and defensibly: if, in a country, human casualties occur over a short period on a scale that, in terms of human shock and social impact, evokes the image of ‘a catastrophe on the scale of a major explosion’, fundamental questions arise about the restraints on that system. Not because every death is equivalent to a bomb, but because when the decision-makers’ thinking reaches numbers of this magnitude, it is no longer operating within the bounds of public morality. This is where we must say: whatever the figure cited in the various accounts from Iran may be, it means one thing: to remain in power, the government has pushed the ceiling on violence very high. And when this message is connected to the nuclear dossier, it alarms the world. 4) Rumour or warning? When the language of ‘heavy weapons’ enters the streets People reporting from inside Iran sometimes recount that some agents of repression have said that if the government is cornered, it will use even heavier weapons to intimidate or crush resistance. These are unofficial accounts and, under the current circumstances, are extremely difficult to verify independently. They must therefore be labelled correctly: ‘unconfirmed reports’ or ‘unverifiable quotations’. But even the appearance of such language and political imagination is itself a sign: a sign that, in the logic of repression, the limit on violence is set not by law and morality but by the ‘cost and benefit of survival’. If such a mindset is permitted inside the country, concern about conduct abroad in a crisis is not unfounded. 5) The central gamble: who has the weapon? Let us return here to the same simple and merciless example: a knife in the hands of a healthy person is a tool. In the hands of someone suffering from delusions, uncontrolled anger, or a sense of sacred mission to eliminate others, a knife becomes a catastrophe. A nuclear weapon is exactly the same, except that a ‘knife’ kills one person, while a ‘button’ destroys a city. When a political system places its own survival above people’s lives, and when at critical moments it resorts to concealment and manipulation of the narrative instead of accountability, the main fear is this: that one day the system may conclude that any major gamble is permissible to ensure its survival. This is no longer a question of ‘revelation’ or ‘inspiration’. The point is that in ideological systems, major decisions are sometimes made not on the basis of reality but on the basis of closed beliefs and self-created narratives. That alone is enough to make the international community fear giving such a system instruments of destruction. 6) How can the world contain it? If the problem were only technological, the solution would be purely technical too. But because the issue is the ‘decision-making structure’ and ‘the restraints on it’, the tools of containment must be combined: Rigorous and genuine verification Any agreement without effective monitoring and access is not containment; it is buying time. Against a system in which concealment is standard practice, monitoring must be continuous and enforceable. Credible deterrence Deterrence means that the government knows the cost of adventurism will outweigh its gains. This deterrence is not only military; it is also economic, legal and political. But it must be credible, not a slogan. Crisis-control channels In a region where misunderstandings are easy, communication channels and mechanisms for de-escalation are vital. Without these channels, any small crisis can grow needlessly. Raising the cost of crisis-making networks If proxy warfare and regional threats intensify under a shield of impunity, their cost must be raised: by pursuing financial networks, imposing targeted sanctions, and applying legal and diplomatic pressure to operational arms. Conclusion: the button kills even before it is pressed This article does not seek to trade in fear. It seeks to state one fact plainly: nuclear weapons are dangerous in the hands of any government, but they are doubly dangerous in the hands of a system with weak accountability safeguards and a record of widespread repression. Because there, the danger is not only an explosion; it is ‘impunity’. The danger is that, under the shield of a threat, the government will further suffocate its own people and push the region closer to the precipice. If the world delays in confronting this course today, tomorrow it may face a button that, even without being pressed, holds the security of the Middle East and the lives of the people of Iran hostage. And that is the moment when we must write plainly: the issue is not just the bomb; it is who holds the weapon. And the Islamic Republic, the IRGC and its leader have in practice shown that, when necessary and to preserve their own interests, they have no regard even for the lives of their citizens and their own people. The question is whether they will show regard and restraint towards their neighbours and other countries too. And if Khamenei were to dream one night and say that he had received a revelation that the end times had arrived, then reach for a missile or an atomic bomb, would the world be able to accept such a risk? Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/archive-aef93d77-0a38-2b46-fc7b-eb242937cb99 Please credit the author and link to this edition.