Why Are Russia, China, Some Arab Countries and Turkey Opposed to Regime Change in Iran? S. Rouzbeh ۲ بهمن ۱۴۰۴ Why do Russia, China, Turkey and Gulf Arab governments fear democratic change in Iran? The article examines how sanctions, strategic interests and authoritarian anxieties make a contained Iran seem preferable to a free and prosperous one. The Enigma of Silence and Balance: Why Are Iran’s Neighbours, Russia, China and the Arab States Afraid of Change? Introduction: A Club of Interests, Not a Forum for Values The UN Security Council meeting on 15 January 2026 (25 Dey 1404) on the repression of protests in Iran presented many Iranians with an unvarnished picture: in moments of crisis, ‘values’ usually recede into the background and ‘interests’ take centre stage. The meeting was convened at the request of the United States, and a UN official spoke of protests rapidly turning into ‘nationwide unrest/turmoil’ and of ‘significant casualties’. In that same setting, Russia and China’s positions in practice moved towards the framing favoured by Tehran: emphasis on ‘non-interference’, warnings that the West could escalate the crisis, and a focus on the danger of regional war. The central question is this: why do powers such as Russia and China, and neighbours such as Turkey and the Gulf Arab governments, not only refrain from supporting a democratic transition in Iran, but often behave as if they fear ‘change’? The answer can be summed up in one key concept: a contained Iran. For many external actors, today’s Iran, with all its tensions and crises, is a familiar and negotiable variable. But a free, democratic and flourishing Iran would upend existing calculations and burn through rents accumulated over many years amid weakness, sanctions, economic isolation and domestic instability. Alongside these calculations, there is also a hidden fear: the ‘domino effect’. Authoritarian governments fear a major transformation in a country such as Iran because it could awaken another spring in the region, or at least raise dangerous questions about legitimacy and models of governance. Foreign policy here is no humanitarian club; it is a club of survival and profit. 1) China: Cheap Energy, the Grey Economy and the Principle of Non-Interference China views Iran primarily through the lens of supply chains: energy, markets and transit routes. For Beijing, Iran is not an ideological ally, but a ‘supplier under pressure’. Pressure means discounts. Sanctions mean a grey economy. And a grey economy means the opportunity to trade in the shadows, away from full Western competition. The Grey Economy and the Sanctions Windfall Under sanctions, Iran is forced to sell energy at a discount and use informal financial and intermediary networks. This creates an advantage for China: cheaper purchases and the sale of goods in a market where European and American competitors are either absent or restricted. A free Iran that eases tensions would mean the return of competition, greater transparency and the opening of the economy to major companies. This is precisely where China’s interests are threatened: the end of relative monopoly and the end of the ‘sanctions advantage’. The 25-Year Agreement and Strategic Ambiguity In the Iranian public imagination, long-term agreements and cooperation with China are a sensitive issue—not simply because of cooperation itself, but because of the ‘ambiguity’ surrounding it. When society is unaware of the details, the perception grows that, at a time when Tehran’s bargaining power is weak, China has secured a foothold in infrastructure and key sectors. The issue here goes beyond the terms themselves: a lack of transparency burns through social capital and turns public trust in foreign relations into chronic suspicion. Fear of the Spread of Democracy China usually objects in the Security Council to human-rights resolutions and interventionist language. This is not merely a defence of Tehran; it is a defence of a principle: ‘domestic affairs must not threaten the international legitimacy of governments’. Beijing does not want a precedent to be established that could be used against it in the future. That is why, at critical moments, it prefers ‘stability’ to ‘freedom’—even when the cost to the Iranian people is heavy. 2) Russia: Iran as a Stronghold, and Fear of the Streets After the war in Ukraine, Russia needs a network of partners and routes for circumventing pressure more than ever. In this context, Iran offers Moscow several advantages: anti-Western geopolitics, the possibility of security cooperation, and leverage in regional crises. Russia’s tone at the Security Council meeting followed the same course: warnings to the ‘hardliners’ in Washington and emphasis on the claim that external pressure intensifies the crisis. Convergence in the Post-Western Era Moscow sees Iran as part of a camp intended to diminish the West’s influence in the region. In the Kremlin’s view, a free and democratic Iran would be more likely to move towards easing tensions, economic reconstruction and attracting global investment. This path would not only limit Russia’s interests; it would turn Iran from a ‘dependent partner’ into an ‘independent neighbour’—and Russia is not comfortable with an independent neighbour, because independence means being beyond control. Fear of street-led change The Russians have one recurring nightmare: the success of the street. Not as a poetic slogan, but as a threat to domestic security. If the people of Iran can bring about political change, the message for Russian society and other societies under control is dangerous: “It can be done.” For this reason, the Kremlin usually prefers stability built on hard power, even if that stability is built at the cost of blood and imprisonment. 3) Turkey: benefiting from crisis, fearing collapse and profiting from the flight of capital Turkey has a complex relationship with Iran: historical rivalry, economic cooperation and security concerns. Ankara both benefits from Iran’s current situation and fears it. It benefits from the crisis, but fears uncontrolled collapse. Capital flight and tourism In recent years, Turkey has become an important destination for investment and for some Iranians to live: buying property, setting up businesses, cultural consumption, leisure and medical treatment. In practice, Istanbul has become a safety valve for Iran’s middle class—a place where people can breathe a little more freely and make life more bearable. This flow is a source of income and demand for the Turkish economy. A free and prosperous Iran would mean that some of this capital and consumption might return to Iran, and that Iranian cities could become serious competitors to Turkey’s tourism hubs. For Ankara, this would mean losing part of its current advantage. The geopolitical nightmare and the Kurdish question Turkey fears a power vacuum in its neighbour. The experience of Syria showed that insecurity along the border can lead to the strengthening of militia networks and ethnic crises. In this context, the Kurdish question is a security red line for Turkey. Turkey therefore prefers to deal with a centre of power in Tehran, even if it disagrees with it, rather than face an Iran in transition and uncertain borders. 4) The Arab countries of the Persian Gulf: containment rather than change, and fear of a powerful Iran The Arab countries are not all alike, but many share three concerns about change in Iran: energy security, economic competition and the challenge to their legitimacy. Energy security and fear of chaos Any widespread unrest that leads to maritime insecurity or danger in the Strait of Hormuz directly threatens oil and gas exports. They have suffered because of the Islamic Republic, too, but they are even more frightened of “uncontrolled collapse”: multiple centres of power, several armed forces, smuggling, maritime instability and a wave of refugees. In many cases, this is why they prefer containing Iran’s behaviour to changing its structure: they see an uncertain transition as costly. Economic competition in the post-oil era The UAE and Saudi Arabia have major economic projects and want to become hubs for investment, services and transit. A free Iran, with its vast human resources, exceptional geographical position and energy reserves, could quickly become a serious competitor if it returned to the global economy. Today, Dubai derives part of its role from acting as an intermediary for Iran’s sanctions-hit economy. A free Iran would mean less need for intermediaries—and a shift in the balance of interests. The challenge to legitimacy and fear of a second Spring A democratic Iran at the heart of the region would be more than a political change; it would raise a social question: Why not us? For authoritarian governments, a “model” is more dangerous than an “enemy”. An enemy can be turned into a target of propaganda, sanctioned and contained. A model cannot. For this reason, many governments fear a major transformation in Iran, because it could intensify a wave of questioning and demands across the region. Historical memory: the shadow of the Pahlavi era and fear of Iran’s return as a powerful state There is an important layer here that is mentioned less often in official analyses, but is not irrelevant to regional calculations: the historical memory of a powerful Iran before 1979. Many governments in the region have not seen Iran only as the Islamic Republic. They also remember a period when Iran carried considerable economic and political weight in the region and had a powerful state apparatus. This memory, alongside today’s crisis, creates an unconscious comparison: if Iran breaks free from the grip of crisis, it could quickly become a much bigger player than it is today. Within this framework, the prominence of Prince Reza Pahlavi in the opposition’s political landscape is not merely a personal or symbolic issue for some regional players. They believe a successful transition could bring Iran’s human and financial capital back to the country: managers, specialists, university professors, entrepreneurs, and capital now scattered across Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and neighbouring countries. Such a return could set Iran’s economy back on a path from exhaustion to rapid growth. For governments that benefit from a «weak Iran» or fear a «strong Iran», this scenario is not appealing. This point must be made precisely and journalistically: the issue is not that all of Iran’s neighbours oppose the prosperity of the Iranian people. The issue is that some of their economic and geopolitical interests are shaped by the current situation. In this cold equation, the lives of the Iranian people often do not come first; as we also saw at the UN Security Council meeting, some powers were more concerned about the «costs of war» and «non-intervention» than about people’s right to protest without being shot. And there is, of course, another bitter truth: among all the players, the only government that has repeatedly shown itself willing to sacrifice the national interests of its own people is the Islamic Republic itself; a government that, in order to survive politically, both burns through domestic resources and grants foreign concessions in a way that society experiences as «privileges for those abroad and pressure at home». Conclusion: Moving Beyond Strategic Isolation The Iranian nation faces strategic isolation on its path to freedom. The world and the region do not act according to human rights values; they make decisions by calculating costs and benefits. For many of them, a weakened and beleaguered Iran is less costly than a powerful, democratic Iran. But this situation is not immutable. What should be done? There is only one way: change their calculations. Not by pleading, but through three clear tools: One: Building Domestic Strength The greater the national cohesion, capacity for organisation and continuity of civil protest, the higher the cost of supporting the status quo. Stability cannot be sustained by batons. Two: Alternative Diplomacy The Iran of tomorrow must be imaginable to the world: a responsible partner, not an exporter of crises. The brighter and more credible the image of Iran’s future, the less governments will fear the unknown. Three: Documentation and Transparency Opaque contracts, networks of patronage and mechanisms of plunder must be documented. Foreign parties must understand that in Iran’s future, contracts lacking national legitimacy may be reviewed. This message raises the cost of backroom dealings with the status quo. The world will come to terms with a free Iran when it sees that standing against the nation costs more than dealing with a new Iran. And that day will be built not with emotion, but with realities on the ground: the reality of a cohesive national will. If you like, in the next version I can give Kayhan London a shorter, sharper lead and make the ending more news-oriented too (less rhetorical, more focused on the conclusions). Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/archive-d1a759a3-f51e-16ff-992a-8c7c9782869d Please credit the author and link to this edition.