The Strait of Hormuz Is Not the Suez Canal: The Legal Error in Normalising Iran’s Claim S. Rouzbeh ۱۴۰۵/۰۱/۲۴ S. Rouzbeh examines why the Strait of Hormuz cannot be equated with artificial canals such as Suez and Panama, and why treating tolls for passage through it as normal risks legitimising a weak and costly legal claim. S. Rouzbeh – Can the Strait of Hormuz be equated with artificial canals such as Suez and Panama? Does the Islamic Republic have the right under international law to charge ships for passage through the strait? And might falling into the trap of this flawed comparison inadvertently normalise a weak legal claim that could prove costly for Iran’s future? At a time when there is once again talk of charging ‘tolls’ to ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz, some reports and analyses, by placing examples such as Suez, Panama, Malacca and the Turkish straits side by side, have given the impression that charging tolls in Hormuz could also be considered normal, or at least comparable to other passageways around the world. This is precisely where the fundamental error occurs. Hormuz is neither the Suez Canal nor the Panama Canal, nor is it an asset constructed by a state that could levy tariffs for the use of its infrastructure. The Strait of Hormuz is a natural, international passageway and has its own special regime under the law of the sea. The official text of Part III of the Law of the Sea Convention, concerning straits used for international navigation, and Reuters’ report on the position of the International Maritime Organization make this distinction clear. To make the discussion clear from the outset, three terms must be distinguished: Waterway is a general term encompassing any water route that can be used for travel and transport, whether natural or artificial. Canal usually means a water route built or substantially engineered by humans, such as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. The state or authority administering it charges ships tolls for the maintenance, services, traffic management and use of the infrastructure. Strait means a narrow natural passage connecting two larger bodies of water. When such a strait is used for global navigation, it falls into the category of ‘straits used for international navigation’ and is subject to the special regime of Transit Passage. This distinction is not merely a matter of terminology; it is the foundation of the legal assessment of Hormuz. The text of the Law of the Sea Convention sets out this framework clearly. For this reason, the first flaw in some reports is that they conflate ‘strategic importance’ with ‘legal regime’. It is true that Suez, Panama, Malacca and Hormuz are all important global chokepoints, but geopolitical importance does not mean that they are legally identical. Suez and Panama are engineered infrastructure, and the tolls charged for passage through them are tied to the use of a facility and the cost of operating it. Hormuz, however, is a natural strait; Iran did not build or create it and, in this respect, is not the owner of artificial infrastructure entitled to charge for the mere act of passage. This point must be at the centre of any serious analysis. Part III of the Law of the Sea Convention states that ships and aircraft have the right of ‘transit passage’ through straits used for international navigation, and that coastal states must not impede or suspend this passage. Coastal states may, of course, play a role in areas such as navigational safety, the regulation of routes and the prevention of pollution, but their authority is valid only insofar as it does not in practice obstruct the right of passage. To put it plainly, there is a fundamental difference between ‘legislating for safety’ and ‘charging money simply for passage’. The position of the International Maritime Organization, as reported by Reuters, says the same thing: imposing a toll in Hormuz would set a ‘dangerous precedent’ and would not be compatible with the legal framework governing international straits. There is another important distinction here: the difference between tolls for passage and charges for services. In many ports, canals or certain passageways, fees may be charged for pilotage, towing, berthing or port services. But that is not the same as what is being proposed for Hormuz today. The issue is not charging for a specific service; it is turning passage through a natural international strait itself into a source of revenue or an instrument of political pressure. This is where the comparison with Suez and Panama leads readers in the wrong direction. Another point is that the Strait of Hormuz is not Iran’s exclusive property. This passage lies between Iran and Oman and is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. The International Energy Agency says that in 2025, nearly 15 million barrels a day of crude oil—about 34 per cent of global seaborne crude oil trade—passed through Hormuz. The same source says that most of these exports are destined for Asia, with China and India receiving 44 per cent between them. Therefore, any interference with Hormuz would not affect only the United States or Europe; it would also affect Asian energy markets, maritime insurance, global shipping and the world’s commercial supply chains. This brings us to the more important part of the analysis: the danger of falling into the trap of false assumptions. When a government under pressure and in decline tries to create a bargaining chip for itself by interfering with global chokepoints, it may imagine in the short term that it has acquired a new lever. But if that lever rests on a weak interpretation of international law, the result may be the opposite. Rather than generating power, it strengthens global consensus against it. Rather than establishing legitimacy, it puts others in the position of defending freedom of navigation and energy security. European officials’ open opposition to the proposed tolls in Hormuz and warnings from international bodies are signs of this process. Reuters’ report on Greece’s opposition and the risk to freedom of navigation, as well as its report on the IMO’s position, clearly illustrate this climate. A fair criticism of reports of this kind is not to claim that a particular media outlet is deliberately trying to encourage the Islamic Republic. Such a judgement cannot be substantiated. A more precise criticism is that when no legal distinction is drawn between an artificial canal, a natural strait and a strategic waterway, the article inadvertently helps to normalise a weak claim. If readers come away thinking, ‘Charging tolls on waterways is normal, so doing so in Hormuz is not strange either’, they have in fact fallen into the trap of a flawed comparison. The main problem is not a lack of examples; it is the conflation of concepts. Meanwhile, some in Iran may believe that by threatening Hormuz they can keep the world on the defensive indefinitely. But this, too, is an oversimplification. The International Energy Agency says that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are currently the only countries with limited operational routes to bypass part of Hormuz, and that their spare capacity is around 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels a day—a figure far below the total volume of energy passing through Hormuz. So it cannot yet be said that Hormuz will become irrelevant tomorrow. But here is the important point: every time the Islamic Republic uses Hormuz as a threat, it strengthens the incentive for the world and its neighbours to expand pipelines, alternative ports and bypass routes. This means Tehran may exert pressure today, while at the same time pushing others to neutralise that lever. If the matter reaches the United Nations or the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the Islamic Republic’s room for manoeuvre will still be limited. At the United Nations, the outcome is likely to be political and diplomatic rather than judicial: greater pressure, formal registration of objections, diplomatic condemnation and a stronger global consensus on freedom of navigation. The Security Council can convene a meeting and emphasise the need to keep the shipping route open, although the veto may prevent tougher decisions. United Nations documents and reports of Security Council meetings illustrate this framework. At the International Court of Justice in The Hague, too, the foremost issue is “jurisdiction”. The Court can hear disputes between states only if it has a basis for jurisdiction—that is, if both parties have consented or there is a clear treaty basis. The International Court of Justice itself explicitly states that its jurisdiction in contentious cases rests on the consent of states. Iran has signed, but not ratified, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which makes matters more difficult for claimants from the point of view of jurisdiction. But even if a case clears this hurdle, defending the levying of tolls in a natural international strait would be extremely difficult, since the principle of transit passage and the opposition of international maritime bodies to interference with it weigh heavily against Tehran’s position. In this context, the conclusion can be stated plainly: the Islamic Republic may be able to escape immediate pressure at the Security Council with the help of a veto, but legally and normatively, defending the levying of tolls in Hormuz would be extremely difficult; and even if jurisdictional obstacles prevent a legal case from proceeding, the political and international cost of this claim will remain. This is not merely a legal predicament; it is a strategic trap. A country that seeks to gain leverage for itself by manipulating one of the world’s most vital passages may send shockwaves through markets in the short term, but in the long run it risks placing itself in the dock as a disruptor of freedom of navigation, energy security and the global trading order. And it is not only the government that will ultimately pay the price for this position, but the people of Iran as well. The conclusion, then, is that falling for the assumption that Hormuz can be turned into a permanent source of toll revenue, like an artificial canal, is not merely a theoretical misstep; it is a dangerous practical error. Such a mistake might serve as a threat or a bargaining chip in the moment, but over time it could harden global consensus against Iran, steer the world economy towards alternative routes, and leave the country accused of disrupting freedom of navigation. The tactic may work for a moment, but its long-term cost could be far heavier for the people of Iran. That is why this false comparison must not be normalised: Hormuz is not the Suez Canal. Selected sources: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part III: Straits used for international navigation Reuters: The International Maritime Organization described imposing tolls in Hormuz as a dangerous precedent International Energy Agency: The Strait of Hormuz and energy security Reuters: Greece opposes any tolls for passage through Hormuz United Nations documents: Security Council Resolution 2817 International Court of Justice: Basis of jurisdiction Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/archive-d6a9e524-33d9-4361-7942-4618166039c4 Please credit the author and link to this edition.