Should Mojtaba Khamenei Be the Next Name on Amnesty International’s List of Those Responsible for Massacres? S. Rouzbeh ۱۴۰۵/۰۶/۲۷ An examination of claims about Mojtaba Khamenei’s past authority and why an independent investigation into his possible responsibility is necessary. The title does not report any new decision by Amnesty International. S. Rouzbeh Assuming, of course, that Mojtaba Khamenei is alive, the question is not only how he leads today. The more important question is what he did before reaching this position. Those close to him speak of a long record in security, military and political affairs to prove his suitability—and even his courage, one of the principles of leadership, which has so far been concealed. But if such a record is accurate, it cannot be invoked only to establish his suitability and set aside when its consequences are questioned. Years spent exercising authority, if treated as a qualification for attaining power, must also provide grounds for examining responsibility. The title of this article does not report any new decision by Amnesty International. The question is whether the accounts now emerging from within the family and the government make it more necessary to investigate Mojtaba Khamenei’s role in past crackdowns. Three questions set out the course of the discussion: 1. Are those close to Mojtaba Khamenei building a record to prove his suitability, or are they inadvertently providing clues for examining his past responsibility? 2. If his orders carried the same authority with commanders as his father’s, where did the boundary lie between an “aide to the Leader” and an “empowered decision-maker”? 3. To investigate his responsibility for the crackdowns, what must be established: the orders he gave, the reports he received, or the actions he had the authority to prevent? If Mojtaba’s word was his father’s word... In an interview with issue 27 of the magazine Khat, Farid al-Din Haddad Adel, the brother of Mojtaba Khamenei’s wife, attributes to Mojtaba around 25 years of assisting in security, military and political affairs. He also speaks of Mojtaba’s close ties with Hossein Salami and Ali Fadavi, and his role in resolving disagreements among commanders. The interview has been republished by domestic media, including Alef, citing Fars. The most significant part of this account is an anecdote, attributed to Ali Fadavi, about an operational order. According to the story, after doubts were raised about carrying out the order, Ali Khamenei said: “The word of Mr Mojtaba is my word.” But the date and subject of the order are not specified, and the account is relayed second-hand. Moreover, in another part of the same interview, Haddad Adel says he had no professional dealings with Mojtaba. These statements can therefore be regarded as clues worth investigating. If Mojtaba Khamenei’s orders carried executive authority within the military and security apparatus, where did that authority come from, and how far did it extend? Was he merely conveying his father’s message, or did he also play a part in decision-making? Who was required to carry out his orders? It is answers to these very questions that could clarify the boundary between family proximity to the Leader and the actual exercise of power. From the streets of 2009 to today’s account Mojtaba Khamenei’s name was also heard in the streets during the 2009 protests. The famous chant, “Mojtaba, may you die before you see the leadership,” reflected some protesters’ concern about his political future and the possibility of power being passed down through the family. And, as we can see, it came true. But it shows that questions about his position and political role are not something invented today, after all these years. The difference today is that this time it is not only opponents who speak about his position; those close to him, too, talk of his long record of activity and authority in security and military affairs. If the claim that he was active for 25 years is true, this period also encompasses the protests of 2009, November 2019, the 2022 uprising and December 2025. This coincidence with statements and interviews is a reason to believe that he took part in all these crackdowns. But it raises an entirely legitimate question: what was his role in each of these periods? Where does his name appear in Amnesty’s report? In its report of 16 September 2026 on the crackdown on the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising, Amnesty International documented crimes against humanity and identified 87 officials for investigation into their criminal responsibility. Ali Khamenei’s name is also on this list. The report is significant because it does not limit responsibility to the officer present on the street; it also examines the chain of command, decision-making, coordination and participation. Mojtaba Khamenei’s name also appears in the report, but not as one of those 87 people. On page 7 of the executive summary, Amnesty International says that on 4 August 2026 it sent him its findings and recommendations and requested his comment. By the time the report was published, no response had been received. Therefore, in this section, Mojtaba Khamenei is the recipient of Amnesty International’s letter, not one of the people included on the list of 87. This distinction matters. At the same time, another point appears on page 25 of the same document: the published list is not exhaustive and should not prevent the investigation of the direct or indirect role of officials whose names do not appear on it. So Mojtaba’s absence from the list does not prove that he had no role; just as receiving a letter from Amnesty International is not, in itself, evidence that he is guilty. Accountability, investigation and trial The link between Amnesty International’s report and statements by people close to Mojtaba Khamenei emerges precisely here. If he held security and military authority within the Islamic Republic’s structure, his actual position in the chain of decision-making must also be clarified. This is the demand made by this article, not a conclusion that can be attributed to Amnesty International. It must be established what reports he received in each period, which decisions he took part in, what orders he issued and what orders he conveyed. If he knew that crimes were being committed and had effective authority over those responsible, the next question is what he did to prevent, stop or pursue them. These questions cannot be answered through speculation or slogans. Records of meetings, correspondence, the actual command structure and testimony from people with relevant knowledge could provide a clearer picture. Accountability, too, must not be limited to a formal explanation. Mojtaba Khamenei must answer to the people for his past authority. His possible role must be the subject of an independent investigation and, if sufficient evidence emerges to attribute criminal responsibility to him, he must be prosecuted and given a fair trial. A trial is for examining an accusation, not for carrying out a sentence that has already been passed. Being someone’s son is not a crime, but neither is it immunity. A father’s death does not transfer criminal responsibility to his son; nor does it erase the son’s possible responsibility for joint decisions or his own actions. Those close to Mojtaba Khamenei cannot highlight his long record of authority when proving his suitability, yet dismiss that record as irrelevant when the consequences of that same authority are at issue. If Mojtaba’s words were his father’s words, what were those words, who carried them out, and who paid the price? S. Rouzbeh Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/archive-db2afc9d-858f-3dbc-49d5-5ec6545ae3f4 Please credit the author and link to this edition.