You Closed Six Doors, Namaki, But Left One Open? The Najaf Exemption and a Question About an Open Door in Iran’s Aviation Sanctions S. Rouzbeh 2026-10-05 This article examines the US exemption allowing Iranian airlines to resume flights to Najaf after sweeping sanctions on Iran’s aviation industry and Iraq’s request to facilitate travel for pilgrims, patients, students and other passengers. It asks how the exemption is defined and monitored, particularly after a sanctioned Iranian airline operated the first resumed flight, and considers whether Najaf’s connections could offer an indirect route to international flights. In an old story from Iranian folklore, a house has seven doors. One night, when it is Namaki’s turn, he closes six of them but forgets the seventh. The demon enters the house through that one door, and a line that has stayed in the memory of Iranians for generations is repeated: “You closed six doors, Namaki, but left one open, Namaki.” This tale also appears in various retellings of the story of “Namaki”. The latest story of flights from Iran to Najaf brought this tale to mind—not because we can know the outcome in advance, but because of a simple question: if the aim of a policy is to close several routes, how much might leaving one route open affect its outcome? On 8 September 2026, the US Treasury Department announced a broad set of sanctions against Iran’s aviation industry as part of “Economic Outcast”. The action sanctioned 27 Iranian airlines. The US Treasury claimed that the Iranian government uses the aviation sector to transport weapons, personnel and illicit cargo, and also uses intermediary companies and routes through third countries to gain access to aircraft and technology. Washington’s message at the time was clear: working with sanctioned airlines could expose foreign companies and institutions to the risk of sanctions and the loss of access to the US financial system. Iraq also suspended flights by Iranian airlines following these sanctions. But this decision soon ran into a practical problem. A large volume of travel between Iran and Iraq involves pilgrims, patients, students and ordinary travellers, and Najaf is one of the main destinations in Iraq for Iranians. Baghdad asked Washington to make an exception for this travel. A Reuters report indicates that, in seeking an exemption, the Iraqi government cited medical, educational and pilgrimage needs, while offering to strengthen passenger screening, information-sharing and measures to prevent the transfer of weapons, sanctioned individuals and illicit funds. The first exemption was granted for a one-month period and was mainly intended for flights operated by Iraqi Airways. But the matter did not remain within those bounds. On 2 October, the Iraqi prime minister’s office announced that Iranian airlines, with the exception of Mahan Air, had been permitted to operate up to 40 flights a day to and from Najaf International Airport. Two days later, on 4 October, the decision was put into effect. The first flight after the suspension belonged to Caspian Airlines and landed in Najaf from Tehran. Najaf airport officials announced the resumption of flights, and Iraqi sources said the first flight carried more than 150 passengers. That first flight itself raises another important question. Caspian Airlines has been on the US Treasury Department’s sanctions list since 2014. When it sanctioned the company, Washington claimed that Caspian had helped elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps transport people and illicit cargo, including weapons, from Iran to Syria. So why was Mahan Air excluded from the new exemption, while Caspian, itself under US sanctions, was able to operate the first flight? This question does not mean that Caspian engaged in illegal activity on its Najaf flight. There is no evidence for such a claim. The issue is the legal and security criteria for the exemption: what activity has been permitted, what remains prohibited, and how is the boundary between the two monitored? On 1 October, the US Treasury Department had confirmed that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Iraq’s foreign minister, Fuad Hussein, had held talks covering Shiite pilgrimages to Najaf, sanctions operations against Iran and the disarmament of armed groups supported by Tehran. Washington, therefore, was not unaware of the political and security dimensions of the issue. However, in the public US Treasury sources available as of 5 October, no complete, standalone text explaining all the conditions of the new exemption for Iranian airlines and the 40-flight limit had been published—or, at least, made publicly accessible. And here the question of the “one open door” becomes more serious. Najaf is not an aviation dead end. It is possible to fly directly from Najaf Airport to Dubai, and from there connect to an extensive network of international flights. Flydubai currently offers the Najaf–Dubai route for sale. So, in practical terms, a scenario like this is possible: Iran → Najaf → Dubai → another destination. For an ordinary Iranian traveller, such a journey is not in itself a breach of sanctions. US sanctions are not a general ban on travel by Iranian citizens. Patients, students, pilgrims and tourists have the right to continue their journeys in accordance with the immigration laws of the countries concerned. But the central question concerns those whose activities the sanctions are specifically intended to restrict. Are the onward destinations of passengers travelling from Iran to Najaf checked? If someone is on a sanctions list or linked to a sanctioned entity, what mechanism is in place to identify them? How are baggage and cargo monitored? Do restrictions apply only until the Iranian aircraft lands in Najaf, or is any subsequent transfer also examined? And if the next flight is operated by a non-Iranian airline, who is responsible for carrying out the checks? These are not allegations that any violation has taken place; they are scenarios that an effective sanctions regime should be prepared to address before they arise. Iraq’s rationale is understandable. A complete suspension of flights could leave thousands of pilgrims, patients, students and families stranded, and Baghdad does not want the cost of Washington’s and Tehran’s policies to fall directly on ordinary citizens. The Iraqi government itself has said that the agreement is intended to facilitate travel for passengers, pilgrims, people seeking medical treatment, tourists and students. But the humanitarian case for an exemption does not remove the need for transparency about its security arrangements. When, less than a month ago, the US Treasury Department sanctioned a large part of Iran’s aviation industry on the grounds that it could be used to transport personnel, weapons and illicit cargo, it is natural to ask how that same policy can be reconciled with allowing sanctioned airlines to operate on a route with capacity for up to 40 flights a day. Perhaps the answer is simple, and there are checks in place whose details have not yet been made public. Perhaps experience of implementing this exemption will show that the concerns were unfounded. But until the details are clear, the question remains: If several doors have been closed to prevent sanctions evasion, what guarantee is there that the door left open in Najaf will be used only by pilgrims, patients and students? Namaki’s story was a children’s tale, but it contained a simple logic that is still easy to understand: Sometimes the issue is not how many doors we have closed. The issue is the one door we have left open. Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/entry-1791225000292-71f60395 Please credit the author and link to this edition.