The Unofficial ‘All or No One’ Doctrine — S. Rouzbeh S. Rouzbeh 2026-10-08 From “One for all, all for one” to “No oil for us, no oil for you”: this article examines a recurring regional political logic attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran, its record in disrupting oil exports and shipping, and whether it has brought neighbouring states closer together. From “One for all, all for one” to “No oil for us, no oil for you” In Alexandre Dumas’s The Three Musketeers, d’Artagnan and his three companions have a motto that later became a symbol of friendship and solidarity; in the commonly used Persian translation: “One for all, all for one.” That is, danger to one is danger to all, and no one leaves another alone in the field. But in the regional politics of the Islamic Republic, another formula has been repeated over the years—one that can be seen as the reverse of that phrase: if we cannot, others must not be able to either. If our oil is not exported, others’ oil must not be exported either; if our security is not ensured, others’ infrastructure must not remain secure either; and if our aircraft cannot fly, others must not be able to fly either. ‘The all-or-no-one doctrine’ is not the official name of any declared document in the Islamic Republic. It is an analytical label for a recurring pattern in the statements of various officials. The question is whether the repetition of a single logic across oil, shipping, security, infrastructure and aviation has become sufficiently coherent for us to speak of an unofficial doctrine. The clear roots of this logic go back at least to 2018. In response to US efforts to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero, Hassan Rouhani said that if Iran’s oil exports were blocked, no oil would be exported from the Persian Gulf either. That same year, Ali Khamenei described the idea that “if Iran’s oil is not exported, no regional country’s oil will be exported” as “the system’s policy and approach”. In 2026, this language became more explicit. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf wrote: “The equation of this war is clear: either all or no one,” adding: “In a region where we do not sell oil, no one will sell oil. If our security is not ensured, no infrastructure will be safe.” A few weeks later, the same logic reached the skies; Mohammad Mokhber wrote: “Flights in the region are either free for everyone or for no one.” First question: has ‘all or no one’ worked? The answer depends on how ‘success’ is defined. If the aim is to impose immediate costs, disrupt shipping, increase transport and energy costs, and demonstrate the capacity to inflict damage, this policy has not been without effect. The Hormuz crisis disrupted energy trade routes and prompted countries in the region to make greater use of pipelines, alternative ports and other ways of transporting oil. But ‘causing harm’ is not the same as ‘forcing others to comply’. If success is measured against the slogan itself—that is, preventing others from exporting until Iran can export oil—the picture is different. According to Kpler data published by Reuters on 28 September, Middle Eastern crude oil exports reached about 16.3 million barrels per day in September, with around 9.7 million barrels per day once again passing through Hormuz. Exports had not yet fully returned to pre-war levels, but the recovery trend was clear. At the same time, Iranian oil was moving in the opposite direction. Reuters reported at the beginning of September that loadings of Iranian crude oil and condensate had fallen from about two million barrels per day in March to around 220,000–255,000 barrels in August. Then preliminary September data compiled by Bloomberg, with Kpler and Vortexa recording similar results, showed that no new Iranian crude oil loadings were recorded during the whole of September. Even so, the paradox is clear: for years, the threat was that if Iranian oil were not exported, others’ oil would not be exported either. Now others’ oil—albeit at a cost, with risks and via alternative routes—is reaching the market again, while fresh loadings of Iran’s own oil in September, according to the available data, have fallen to zero. If ‘everyone’ can once again sell oil, while ‘no one’ comes closer to applying more pressure to Iran itself than anyone else, what remains of the deterrent power of this threat? Second question: has ‘all or no one’ brought others closer to ‘all for one’? The answer is not yet certain. But the Yemeni army’s attack, in cooperation with the Arab countries of the region, and the seizure of Bab al-Mandab, showed another side of the regional game. The countries of the region have not formed a united front against the Islamic Republic. The interests of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq are not the same, and some are still seeking both negotiations and mediation with Tehran. But an important development has taken place. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the “Mecca Mutual Defence Agreement” on 7 August 2026; under the agreement, an attack on any one of the three countries is considered an attack on all of them. The military commanders of the three countries later met to coordinate the implementation of the pact. And today, a sign of that alliance taking shape is visible. It cannot be said without evidence that threats by the Islamic Republic caused this pact to be formed. Officials from the three countries have also emphasised that the agreement is defensive and was not formed against any particular country. But nor can its regional context be ignored. When oil tankers, ports, airports, pipelines and energy infrastructure become targets of threats and conflict, a legitimate question arises: does a policy intended to make each country separately fear the cost of dissent, in practice, create greater incentives for collective security? Here, the play on meaning that opened this article once again becomes important: can “all or no one” inadvertently bring others closer to a kind of “all for one”? Threats: more than a political issue This issue also has a legal dimension. Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter restricts the “threat or use of force” in relations between states. In its 1996 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice also stated that if the contemplated use of force would be unlawful, a threat to use that same force would likewise be unlawful. The Court even referred to military threats intended to compel another state to follow, or not to follow, a particular political or economic course. (International Court of Justice) Therefore, a threat of reciprocal economic action is not the same as a military threat to disable another country’s airport or infrastructure. Each case must be assessed in light of the United Nations Charter, self-defence, necessity and proportionality and, in wartime, the rules of international humanitarian law. In The Three Musketeers, “One for all, all for one” was a pact of mutual support. “All or no one” follows a different logic: any deprivation imposed on me must also be inflicted on others. But if others build alternative routes instead of backing down, share the cost of the threat among themselves, establish joint defence mechanisms and reduce their dependence on the very lever that was meant to serve as a means of pressure, how long can this doctrine continue? Can the Islamic Republic, by extending its threats from oil and the Strait of Hormuz to infrastructure and airspace, compel others to accept its demands? Or will “all or no one” ultimately become the very force that brings others, despite their differences, closer to a kind of “all for one”? S. Rouzbeh Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/entry-1791448375846-0a9416df Please credit the author and link to this edition.