Tell Me Who Your Friend Is, and I Will Tell You Who You Are S. Rouzbeh 2026-11-01 Part One: Türkiye — Trading with Iran or Profiting from the Islamic Republic? Part One: Türkiye — Trading with Iran or Profiting from the Islamic Republic? For some time, I have been following Islamic Republic officials’ dealings with foreign governments and their economic and security agreements. One question keeps returning to my mind: why do countries that sometimes disagree with Tehran continue to do business with it? Do they simply profit from Iran’s market, or does the Islamic Republic’s economic and political structure also offer some of them advantages they do not wish to lose? This is the first of fourteen articles in which I intend to examine the ‘ropes holding up’ the government: ropes made of money, trade, technology, weapons and political cooperation. Not every transaction helps the government survive, and not every trading partner supports it. But wherever money and equipment reach institutions of power, questions of responsibility arise. 1. Neighbours: Rivalry and Cooperation Türkiye and Iran share a border of approximately 560 kilometres which, according to Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has undergone no major change for nearly four centuries. The two governments do not always agree on regional issues, but they have not stopped talking. On 24 January 2024, during Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Ankara, the two countries signed ten agreements, ranging from energy and transport to cooperation between police training institutions. Political disagreement does not prevent business; but business alone does not demonstrate that a country is working to preserve the other country’s government. We must examine which agreement was implemented, for what purpose and to whose benefit. 2. The Economy: From Van to Trade Worth Billions According to official figures from Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trade between the two countries reached US$5.5 billion in 2025: US$3 billion in Turkish exports to Iran and US$2.5 billion in imports from Iran. This figure represents total trade, not Türkiye’s net profit. In Van, hotels, restaurants and shops earn income from Iranian visitors. In September 2026, the deputy head of the city’s chamber of commerce announced that approximately 580,000 Iranians had entered Van through the Kapıköy border crossing during the first eight months of the year, compared with 427,000 in the same period the previous year. But does a shop or hotel in Van earning income mean dependence on the Islamic Republic’s survival? Not necessarily. Iranians could still travel and shop under a different political system. What needs investigating is the interests of intermediaries who benefit from sanctions, import restrictions, price differences and difficulties in transferring money. Who are these intermediaries, and would they enjoy the same advantages in a transparent economy? 3. Weapons: From Contract to Street A joint investigation by IranWire and the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, published in September 2025, examined the presence of models of Turkish-made weapons in the possession of Iranian security forces. In its response to the researchers, the Turkish company Akar (آکار) confirmed that, between 2010 and 2018, it had delivered 20,000 double-barrelled shotguns directly to the Iranian government under a contract with the company ‘Jangafzar’ (جنگ‌افزار). Akar also confirmed a contract to transfer shotgun production technology and establish a production line in Iran. The investigation examines visual evidence of certain Karatay models in the possession of law enforcement forces; however, we cannot conclude that all the weapons covered by this contract were used to suppress protesters. In this case, we must distinguish between sale, delivery to a state institution, inclusion in security forces’ equipment and use in a particular incident. The question for the manufacturer and purchaser is: who was the end user, and how was use monitored? 4. Security Cooperation: How Far Does It Go? Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs records a joint security and law enforcement meeting between the two countries on 29 October 2025. On 14 January 2026, Reuters also reported, citing three anonymous sources, that Türkiye’s intelligence agency had warned the Revolutionary Guards about the possible entry of armed Kurdish groups into Iran from Iraq. Turkish officials did not comment in that report. Such a report matters for understanding intelligence relations. Nevertheless, a warning about an armed group should not, without independent evidence, be described as cooperation in suppressing unarmed protesters. The subject, scope and consequences of security cooperation must be assessed separately. 5. Words and Actions: Where Does the Oil Money Go? On 9 July 2025, the US Treasury Department placed the Türkiye-based company named in the Persian original as ‘پولجولار انرژی’ on its sanctions list. The department stated that, in 2024, the company had purchased shipments of oil allocated to the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force worth hundreds of millions of dollars, with payments made through front companies, bank transfers and cash transfers. This report is an official US government allegation concerning a specific company; it does not establish the responsibility of the entire Turkish government or all Turkish traders. Nevertheless, if such transfers took place, they differ from ordinary tourism-related trade: the issue is the possible provision of funding to a military institution. 6. A Supporting Rope: Who Is Accountable? In the case of Türkiye, we see three types of relationship: ordinary trade and tourism, arms sales and technology transfer, and the oil transactions alleged by the US Treasury Department. Treating these relationships as identical is a mistake; ignoring their differences is also a mistake. The central question remains: does Türkiye profit from Iran’s market, or do some actors profit from the particular features of the Islamic Republic’s structure? If Iran’s political structure changes tomorrow, will trade between the two nations stop, or will only certain intermediaries’ privileges disappear? The governments, companies and institutions involved must one day answer to the Iranian people: what did they sell, to which institution, under what supervision and with what awareness of the possible consequences? In this series, I will put the documents and questions before readers so they can judge for themselves. Sources 1. Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: political relations and agreements between Iran and Türkiye (https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-iran-relations.en.mfa) 2. Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: bilateral trade figures for 2025 (https://www.mfa.gov.tr/iran-ekonomisi.tr.mfa) 3. Report of 12 September 2026 on Iranian tourism in Van (https://www.haberler.com/yerel/van-da-iranli-turist-hareketliligi-yilin-8-ayinda-20231335-haberi/) 4. Iran Human Rights Documentation Center and IranWire: Weapons Without Borders, September 2025 (https://iranhrdc.org/weapons-without-borders-how-imported-weapons-fuel-state-violence-in-iran/) 5. US Treasury Department: sanctions on a financial network linked to the Quds Force, 9 July 2025 (https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0191) 6. Reuters: report of 14 January 2026 on Türkiye’s intelligence warning (https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/exclusivearmed-kurdish-groups-sought-to-cross-into-iran-from-iraq-sources-say-4447608) Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/entry-1793577899406-c0fa0951 Please credit the author and link to this edition.