Tell Me Who Your Friend Is, and I’ll Tell You Who You Are! (The UAE) S. Rouzbeh 2026-11-05 The UAE has long been one of Iran’s main routes for trade, goods and financial flows, despite the dispute over the three islands. This article examines the tension between political disagreement and economic cooperation, Dubai’s role in supplying Iranian markets, and the use of UAE-based companies in transactions linked to Iran’s shadow banking system. Number Three: The UAE; the dispute over the islands, billion-dollar trade and financial networks The lifelines sustaining the Islamic Republic In examining the lifelines sustaining the Islamic Republic, after Turkey and China I come to the United Arab Emirates: a country that, on the one hand, disputes Iran’s ownership of the three islands and, on the other, has for years been one of Iran’s most important routes for trade, the movement of goods and the circulation of money. The question is this: how can a country that disputes Iran’s territorial integrity at the same time be one of its main routes for economic exchange? Are these relations simply ordinary trade between two countries, or has the Islamic Republic’s opaque sanctions-busting structure created particular benefits for certain companies and intermediaries? 1. The Three Islands: Dispute and Cooperation The UAE claims sovereignty over Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb; Iran rejects this claim and asserts its sovereignty over the islands. Despite this dispute, economic relations have never been entirely governed by political disagreements. In April 2024, the two countries’ Joint Economic Commission met for the first time in ten years. In February 2026, representatives of the two governments also held talks in Tehran about expanding cooperation. This shows that political disagreement and economic interests can coexist. But who benefits from the continuation of these relations? 2. Dubai: The Goods Market and Lanj Trade According to figures reported by the World Trade Organization, in 2024 the UAE was the country of origin for around $21 billion, equivalent to 30.6 per cent, of Iran’s imports. A large share of the goods that reached Iran from the UAE were not produced there; they had instead been imported into Dubai from global markets and then re-exported. This relationship is familiar to me. For years, I have known the role Dubai’s market plays in supplying Iran with cars, spare parts, electronic goods and consumer products. Iranian customs figures also show that, in the first half of 1403, around 14 per cent of the value of imported car parts came from the UAE. Alongside formal trade, Iranian lanj boats have for years carried goods between Dubai and the southern ports, from Bandar Abbas and Bandar Lengeh to Bushehr, Qeshm and Kish. Of course, lanj trade is not necessarily smuggling. Some of it is legal, while some may take place outside customs regulations. The important question is: who has profited from these routes, price differences, import restrictions and intermediary dealings? 3. Shell Companies: Where Does the Oil Money Go? In October 2025, the US Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN, published a report on Iran’s shadow banking system. According to the report, around $6.4 billion of the transactions identified in the 2024 dataset were connected to companies based in the UAE, and 99 per cent of those companies were located in Dubai. This figure does not represent profit for the UAE, but rather the financial flows identified within a specific dataset of suspicious transactions. The US Treasury Department has also sanctioned companies in the UAE for their alleged role in transferring oil revenues linked to Iran’s Quds Force and Ministry of Defence. This is where we must distinguish between an ordinary trader’s business and the financing networks of military institutions. The issue is not simply the sale of goods; it is how financial resources are transferred, and who transfers them. 4. Security: How Far Does Cooperation Go? The official list of agreements between Iran and the UAE includes extradition treaties, judicial cooperation and a memorandum of understanding on combating drug trafficking. However, the documents reviewed do not establish that the UAE government directly sold equipment for suppressing street protests to the Islamic Republic. In November 2022, the UAE also abstained from voting on the resolution to establish a fact-finding mission into the suppression of the Woman, Life, Freedom protests. This vote was neither direct opposition to establishing the mission nor support for it. Even so, it matters when examining the distance between diplomatic relations and taking a position on the rights of the people of Iran. 5. Conflicting Interests: A Change in Policy in 2026 On 19 August 2026, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that trade and financial dealings with Iran would be suspended until further notice. The decision came after regional tensions escalated, although Dubai had been one of Iran’s principal trade routes for decades. However, subsequent Financial Times reports showed that some banking and commercial activities continued, while alternative routes, including Oman and India, were also being used. We must therefore distinguish between announcing a suspension of transactions and implementing it in full. This shift in policy raises a serious question: will economic relations continue only as long as the benefits they bring outweigh the security costs? 6. The Lifeline: Whose Interests Does It Serve? The UAE case reveals three distinct kinds of relationship: ordinary trade between two societies; intermediary networks that benefit from economic restrictions; and companies accused of transferring financial resources to the Islamic Republic’s military institutions. These relationships cannot all be treated alike. But if oil money has been transferred to military institutions through shell companies, this is no longer simply ordinary trade; questions must be asked about the responsibility of companies and regulatory bodies, and about the end users. Does the UAE benefit from trade with Iran, or do certain networks benefit from the particular characteristics of the Islamic Republic? If Iran’s political structure changes, will these interests disappear, or will only the form of trade change? These are questions that the governments and companies involved will one day have to answer to the Iranian people. In this series of articles, my aim is to identify these lifelines—not to pass judgement on every country, but to shed light on relationships that may have helped the Islamic Republic remain in power. The final judgement belongs to the people of Iran. Sources and documents 1. Reuters; meeting of the Iran–UAE Joint Economic Commission, April 2024 2. Iran Customs, quoted by Tasnim; car-parts import figures for the first half of 1403 3. FinCEN; report on Iran’s shadow banking, October 2025 4. US Department of the Treasury; financial networks linked to the Quds Force, September 2025 5. UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs; list of bilateral agreements 6. United Nations; vote on the fact-finding mission on the protests in Iran, November 2022 7. UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs; announcement of the suspension of trade with Iran, August 2026 8. Financial Times; disruption to Iran–Dubai trade routes, August 2026 Source: https://srouzbeh.com/en/posts/entry-1794093938595-073e18cc Please credit the author and link to this edition.