Taking Iran Back from the Regime and the Deal-Makers

S. Rouzbeh – Is Iran’s fate decided only in the streets of Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, Zahedan and the country’s other cities, or is it also determined around tables set in distant capitals?

If the Islamic Republic poses such a great threat to the people of Iran, and even to the security of the region and the world, why do so many powers still fear its definitive end?

And when Prince Reza Pahlavi says, “The endgame is for the people of Iran to take their country back,” is this merely a political slogan, or a warning to all those who want to manage and bargain over Iran’s future behind closed doors?

On the evening of Tuesday, 8 Ordibehesht 1405, corresponding to 28 April 2026, Prince Reza Pahlavi spoke with Sean Hannity on Fox News. He stressed the need to maintain pressure on the Islamic Republic, target the regime’s infrastructure and create an opportunity for the people of Iran to return to the streets. He said this must not be left unfinished; it must be carried through to the end. His central statement was clear: “The endgame is for the people of Iran to take their country back.” Read correctly, this sentence is addressed not only to the Islamic Republic, but also to foreign powers, wavering forces within the system and the people of Iran themselves.

Iran cannot be treated as an ordinary political crisis. The people of Iran are not facing a government that has left open avenues for lawful protest, free elections, independent media, international oversight or reform from within. The Islamic Republic has closed every natural path to change. It suppresses protests, imprisons critics, threatens journalists, puts pressure on the families of opponents, kills young people in the streets and blinds people. It turns execution into an instrument of fear and raises a security and ideological wall even against people’s most basic demand: the right to choose freely.

This is where the significance of the Prince’s words becomes clear. If the way to protest freely were open, people would protest. If free elections existed, people would use the ballot box. If independent courts existed, criminals would be held to account. If free media existed, the truth would not remain hidden. But when all these avenues are closed, people cannot be expected to play on a field where every means is in the hands of the oppressor. That is what an “uneven playing field” means.

The Islamic Republic is not merely a repressive government; it is a deeply rooted network of power, money, ideology, coercive forces, propaganda and external ties. On the one hand, the regime intimidates people with prisons, executions, torture, shots aimed at their eyes and bodies, plain-clothes agents, hijab patrols, interrogators and judges; on the other, it sustains itself beyond its borders through proxy networks and regional and global interests. These ties mean that Iran’s problem cannot be resolved solely within Iran, while many powers also have interests in the controlled survival or managed handling of this crisis.

In such circumstances, it is impossible to imagine that any single factor could, on its own, bring the Islamic Republic to an end. Street protests without support and coordination can lead to another massacre. Foreign pressure without the presence of the people can end in yet another deal. Sanctions that fail to target the real pillars of power place the burden on the people. A split within the system, without a clear alternative, can lead to the same system being reproduced under a different face. That is why the path to taking Iran back must be seen as a table with six legs: if one leg is weak, the whole future falls to the ground.

The first leg is targeted external pressure: pressure aimed not at the people, but at the regime’s real pillars.

The second leg is the readiness and presence of the people, because no change has legitimacy or durability without the national will.

The third leg is a split within the forces of repression, because as long as the machinery of repression acts as one, the streets will remain costly and bloody.

The fourth leg is a clear political alternative, so that after the collapse the country does not fall into a vacuum, chaos or another deal, and the focus remains on leadership during the transition.

The fifth leg is preventing powers from bargaining over Iran’s future, because many countries have always made decisions according to their own interests, not the suffering of the people of Iran.

The sixth leg is the communications and messaging network, because without communication there can be no coordination, and without a narrative the truth is buried beneath the regime’s propaganda.

So when Prince Reza Pahlavi says that the regime has been weakened but has not yet fallen, we should understand the statement in this context. It means that pressure has begun, but it is not enough. The people are ready, but the playing field is still uneven. Cracks are visible, but they have not yet become decisive. The freedom-seeking narrative of Iran is being heard around the world, but different powers are still trying to manage Iran’s future within the framework of their own interests. That is why he warns that the task must not be left unfinished.

Taking Iran back means more than the fall of the Islamic Republic. More profoundly, it means that Iran’s future should belong neither to the regime, nor to foreign deal-makers, nor to groups that want to profit from a power vacuum. Taking Iran back means that, at the right moment, the people of Iran can reclaim their country from the structure of repression, with the least possible human cost and the greatest possible political preparedness.

The central question is this:

Can these six legs come together at the same time? If there is external pressure but the people are not ready, the result will be incomplete. If the people are ready but the machinery of repression is not broken, the cost will be high. If the machinery of repression is worn down but there is no clear alternative, the future will remain uncertain. If there is an alternative but messaging and communications are weak, society will not be able to coordinate. And if all of this is in place but foreign powers bargain over Iran’s future at their tables, the people of Iran will once again be deprived of their historic right.

For this reason, the Prince’s words should be read not as a slogan, but as a warning and a road map. The Islamic Republic will not collapse with a single blow, because it rests on several pillars. Taking Iran back, then, cannot be achieved through any one factor; the entire puzzle must come together. This is where the people of Iran, political forces, the media, the wavering ranks within the establishment, and foreign powers each face a question: should Iran’s future be returned to the people of Iran, or once again divided between the regime and the deal-makers?