Flights Continue—but at What Cost?

How can fresh US sanctions disrupt flights to and from Iran without formally closing its skies?

Can foreign airlines such as Turkish Airlines, Qatar Airways and Emirates keep Iran’s air links with the rest of the world open?

Sanctioning an airline does not necessarily mean that its airspace will immediately close or that its flights will automatically be cancelled. Flight permits may remain in force, while a bank, insurer, fuel supplier, parts supplier or ground-services provider may refuse to cooperate. In such circumstances, a flight may be legally possible, but it becomes more difficult and costly to operate. Here, we want to examine these issues.

On 8 September 2026, the US Treasury sanctioned 36 targets linked to Iran’s aviation industry, including 27 airlines. At the same time, companies and intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Kazakhstan were also targeted over their roles in transferring aircraft, parts and cargo services, or providing commercial support to Iranian airlines. The new pressure therefore targets not only the airlines themselves, but also the network that enables them to continue operating.

Experience from 2010 and 2011 shows how this pressure works. Iran Air continued to fly to London and several European countries, but some suppliers refused to provide fuel. In most cases, after leaving the countries concerned, aircraft had to stop at another airport, refuel and then continue to Tehran. The skies were not closed; one of the essential links in the flight had failed.

Today, there are more such links. An international flight needs fuel, ground handling, insurance, repairs, cargo services and the ability to settle payments. Iranian banks’ limited access to international correspondent banking relationships, along with SWIFT restrictions, has made money transfers more difficult. SWIFT disconnected Iranian banks subject to EU sanctions in 2012, and in 2018 it again suspended access for some Iranian banks. In June 2026, the FATF also kept Iran on its list of high-risk countries subject to countermeasures. So even if a company in a third country is willing to provide services, its bank may not be willing to process the payment.

Iran has previously used aircraft leasing and wet leases—that is, leasing an aircraft together with its crew. In 2013, the US Treasury sanctioned companies in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates for leasing or selling aircraft to Mahan Air and Iran Air. The targeting of foreign intermediaries in the latest sanctions package shows that Washington wants to make these routes riskier too.

It is still too soon to jump to conclusions about foreign airlines. US sanctions do not, in themselves, prohibit Turkish Airlines, Qatar Airways or Emirates from flying to Tehran. But on 8 September, the US suspended three authorisations related to Iranian aviation that had facilitated the entry into Iran of certain US aircraft, or aircraft subject to US export regulations, operated by non-US companies. Whether these flights continue will therefore depend on the type of aircraft, how the regulations are interpreted and each company’s commercial decision.

The experience of 2024 showed the impact of losing direct flights on people. After the European Union sanctioned Iran Air, the airline’s flights to Europe stopped, and Istanbul, Dubai, Doha and Muscat became connecting points for many Iranians travelling abroad. The result was not just more expensive tickets: journey times grew longer, the risk of missing a connecting flight increased, and hotel, baggage and stopover costs were added to the trip.

But the new sanctions do not affect only international travellers. Iran’s aviation industry faces an ageing fleet, parts shortages, lengthy repairs and difficulties sourcing engines. Whenever a part has to pass through several intermediaries and third countries rather than being bought directly, repair costs and times rise. An aircraft spending more time on the ground means fewer seats, fewer flights and more pressure on domestic ticket prices.

The economic ripple effect begins here. Fewer flights can reduce the income of taxi and airport-car drivers, ground-handling and cargo staff, catering businesses, fuel suppliers, shops, travel agencies, freight companies, cleaning and security services, and hotels near airports. A reduction in flights does not necessarily mean immediate redundancies, but it can lead to fewer shifts, less overtime, fewer orders and lower incomes in these jobs, putting pressure on their families’ livelihoods.

An estimate published in 1404 put Iran’s aviation industry at more than 45,000 direct jobs and more than 120,000 indirect jobs. These figures should be treated as approximate, but they indicate the scale of the impact: disruption to aviation affects not only pilots and cabin crew, but also technicians, airport employees, drivers, baggage handlers, shop workers and thousands of related jobs.

Air freight is another link in the chain. Industrial components, specialist equipment and urgently needed goods use some of the cargo capacity on passenger aircraft. Fewer flights or higher air-service costs can make these goods slower and more expensive to import. The additional costs are first borne by importers and manufacturers, then may be passed on to consumers through the prices of goods and services. Care is needed when discussing medicines and humanitarian goods: these are generally exempt, but banks’ and transport companies’ fear of sanctions can make even permitted transactions more difficult.

Of course, not every rise in prices or problem in the aviation industry can be attributed to sanctions. Exchange rates, fuel prices, war and regional insecurity, domestic management, the age of the fleet and reduced seat capacity also play a part. In this context, sanctions are chiefly an aggravating factor: they raise costs, limit alternatives and add financial and operational friction.

The Islamic Republic may, as in the past, turn to intermediaries, aircraft leasing or alternative routes. The history of sanctions shows that an alternative can usually be found—but it is almost always more expensive and more fragile. A cost that first appears in the accounts of an airline or repair company may later be reflected in ticket prices, freight charges, the cost of goods and the incomes of thousands of dependent workers.

Who ultimately pays the price of this pressure: airlines and networks connected to the Islamic Republic, or people who have no part in political and military decisions but must pay more to travel, work and live?

S. Rouzbeh