From Aladdin to the Grand Bazaar: Why Did Taeb Turn to the Merchants?

S. Rouzbeh – Why, just a few weeks after returning to the head of the Basij Organisation, did Hossein Taeb direct one of his first important messages towards the market and the merchants? If the Basij of the Guilds, trade associations and government networks have been present in the market for years, why is there renewed emphasis today on “effective monitoring” and preventing a “negative psychological atmosphere”? And is this only about price-gouging and hoarding, or is the government worried that an economic protest could once again turn into a political one?

On 5 Shahrivar, at a ceremony marking the Day of the Basij of the Guilds, Taeb said that the market, production and trade were also part of the front against the enemy. He called on the Basij of the Guilds, chambers of guilds and trade associations to monitor the market, combat hoarding and price-gouging, and prevent a “negative psychological atmosphere” from taking hold. These remarks take on greater significance when we know that his recent appointment decree also emphasised strengthening the “people’s intelligence network”.

These two phrases must be considered together: “people’s intelligence network” and “monitoring the market”. Taeb’s security background and the language of his appointment decree make it entirely reasonable to ask whether the government wants to turn the network of trade associations into an early-warning system: one that identifies discontent before shops close, strikes begin or gatherings form.

The reason for this concern lies in the market’s history. In Tir 1397, protests over the currency’s sharp rise began at the Aladdin shopping centre and the mobile-phone market, and a day later spread to parts of Tehran’s Grand Bazaar. Seven years later, on 7 Dey 1404, the same pattern appeared again: shopkeepers in Aladdin and Charsou closed their shops in response to the dollar’s surge, and the protest spread to Shush Market and parts of the Grand Bazaar. What had begun as a trade-related and economic protest had moved beyond the confines of a single shopping centre.

Economic pressures are even greater today. On 3 Shahrivar this year, the free-market dollar rate passed 205,000 tomans, while gold and coin prices also set new records. Reports from Tehran indicated that some sellers had temporarily stopped trading because prices were changing constantly. For a trader who sells goods today but does not know at what price they will be able to replace them tomorrow, the currency crisis is no longer just economic news; it is a question of making a living and staying in business.

Tehran’s bazaar is not an ordinary shopping centre, either. According to figures from the Chamber of Guilds, Tehran has 135 trade associations and nearly 500,000 licensed businesses. The Tehran Chamber of Guilds has also said that a considerable number of the members of 22 trade associations are based in the Grand Bazaar. This means that any serious tension in this area does not affect just a few shops; its effects can be felt in wholesale trade, distribution, prices and the mood across a large part of Tehran’s commercial life.

The market’s physical layout also matters to the government. The Grand Bazaar lies within four main streets: 15 Khordad to the north, Molavi to the south, Mostafa Khomeini, or Cyrus, to the east, and Khayyam to the west. On these four streets, the movement of cars, motorbikes and security forces is far easier than inside the bazaar. But conditions change once you enter its covered lanes, arcades and old passageways: narrow routes, dense crowds, cargo trolleys, shops and the bazaar’s winding layout make the rapid, coordinated movement of large forces more difficult. This is a natural feature of the bazaar’s historic fabric.

This is where the role of local networks becomes important. The bazaar is not just a commercial network; it is also an old social network. More than 50 mosques have been reported inside the bazaar itself. Imam Khomeini Mosque, formerly Shah Mosque, the Grand Bazaar Mosque, Hajj Seyyed Azizollah Mosque and several others have long been places where merchants gather and religious, trade-related and political activities take place.

The Basij of the Guilds is not a new institution, either. In reports from previous years, officials from the organisation had spoken of around 600,000 business members across the country, and reported establishing bases and links with trade associations. In Tehran, too, the Greater Tehran Basij of the Guilds has officially held meetings and organised joint programmes with the Chamber of Guilds, association heads and the bazaar’s board of trustees. So we are not dealing with an entirely new network.

The main question, then, is this: if this network already existed, why is Taeb once again stressing the need to activate it?

One possible answer is that, after the experience of the Dey 1404 protests, the government has realised that a physical presence in the streets alone is not enough to control the market. For a government worried about protests spreading quickly, knowing which trade is becoming discontented, where people are talking about closing up, and how the mood in the market is changing may be as important as sending in forces. But the combination of a “people’s intelligence network” with a new mandate to monitor the market makes this possibility a serious one.

The government can also use administrative tools, trade associations, the granting of favours and the creation of divisions among business owners to prevent a collective decision from taking shape. But all these tools have one fundamental limitation: an intelligence network can report discontent; it cannot remove its causes.

The Basij can monitor prices, but it cannot raise the value of the rial through security reports. It can find out which trader is dissatisfied, but it cannot eliminate the cost of replacing goods, rent, taxes, recession or the collapse in people’s purchasing power.

For the merchant community, too, an effective response is to document the structure itself: which institution has issued which instruction, what information is being collected and by whom, what is being concealed and what disclosed, what pressures the trade associations are under, and who is formally responsible for decisions. The more transparent trade-related demands are, the less room there is for rumour, provocation and division.

Taeb may be able to spot the next spark sooner. But the Islamic Republic’s problem is no longer just a single spark. When the currency crisis, rising prices, recession and mistrust converge, separate streams gradually become a river. An intelligence network may be able to slow the current for a while, but it cannot dry up its source. The government can raise the cost of protest through fear and repression; but it cannot use the Basij of the Guilds to remove the economic crisis from people’s everyday lives.