Reforming the Judiciary or Reorganising It for Days of Crisis?

Why do the names of figures with backgrounds in intelligence protection, prisons, security prosecutors’ offices and crackdowns on protests appear among the judiciary’s new senior officials, and why were the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence among those proposing candidates?

If the stated aim of the sweeping changes in the judiciary is ‘internal reform and reconstruction’ and greater public trust, why do some of those now promoted have backgrounds in intelligence protection, prison management, political-security prosecution or judicial action against protests? And why did Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei say, two days before the changes were announced, that he had also received nominations from bodies outside the judiciary, ‘including the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence’, when selecting people?

Ejei did not say that the IRGC or the Ministry of Intelligence had appointed the judiciary’s senior officials. But the fact that the country’s two principal security agencies were among the sources of candidate nominations raises the question of how much the criteria for selecting officials for the justice system were judicial, and how much security-related.

This article does not examine every appointee; it focuses only on cases where their security or human-rights records can be documented.

Asghar Jahangir: from intelligence protection to inspection

Asghar Jahangir was previously head of the Judiciary’s Protection and Intelligence Centre, then became head of the Prisons Organisation, later served as the judiciary’s social affairs deputy and spokesperson, and is now head of the General Inspection Organisation.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Amnesty International published internal documents from the Prisons Organisation reporting shortages of medical and sanitary facilities, while Jahangir described conditions in prisons as satisfactory. In January 2026, the organisation also recorded that he had called for the ‘maximum punishment’ for the charge of moharebeh and for proceedings to be handled in the shortest possible time.

The Prisons Organisation: a change of person, not of direction

Gholamali Mohammadi, the former head of the Prisons Organisation, was sanctioned by the European Union in March 2026 for responsibility for serious human-rights violations in prisons. His successor, Heydar Asiabi, had also been included among Islamic Republic judicial officials sanctioned by the Government of Canada in June 2023.

These sanctions are not criminal convictions, but they are official human-rights records. The leadership of the Prisons Organisation has therefore passed from one sanctioned official to another who has also been the subject of human-rights sanctions.

Kurdistan: the promotion of a sanctioned prosecutor

Until his latest appointment, Mohammad Jabbari was the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Kurdistan Province. In February 2023, the European Union placed him on its human-rights sanctions list, stating that, as Kurdistan’s prosecutor, he had been responsible for instances of human-rights violations, including death sentences and the suppression of protests, since the 2019 protests.

Jabbari has now been promoted to head of the Kurdistan Judiciary. The previous head of the Kurdistan Judiciary, Hossein Hosseini, had also been sanctioned by the European Union for involvement in suppressing the 2022 protests.

Naser Atabati: from West Azerbaijan to Tehran

Naser Atabati’s appointment as head of the Tehran Judiciary is particularly significant.

Atabati was previously head of the West Azerbaijan Judiciary. In the case of Abbas Lisani, the appeals court presided over by him increased an eight-year prison sentence to 15 years. The Kurdistan Human Rights Network has also reported that he and the Urmia prosecutor met with prisoners sentenced to have their fingers amputated.

In Ordibehesht 1405, Atabati announced that the assets of 129 citizens in West Azerbaijan had been seized on charges including ‘anti-security activities’ and cooperation with ‘hostile countries’. We have no evidence that this record was the reason for his transfer to Tehran, but the question is a legitimate one.

When a political-security deputy becomes the social affairs deputy

Mehdi Amiri Esfahani served for years as Deputy Prosecutor-General for Political and Security Affairs. He has now become Deputy Head of the Judiciary for Social Affairs and Crime Prevention.

This transfer does not prove that the deputyship for social affairs is to become security-focused, but the question remains: does “crime prevention” within the judiciary mean social prevention, or security-based prevention of discontent and protest?

Reform, or preparation for the next phase?

Some previous officials, such as Ali al-Qasi Mehr, have themselves been sanctioned by the United Kingdom.

The issue, then, is not the transformation of a moderate judiciary into a repressive apparatus. The issue is that, in several important appointments in Mordad 1405, experience in intelligence protection, prisons, political and security prosecutions, and protest cases has not been an obstacle to promotion; people with such records have moved into more senior positions.

These changes have not taken place in a vacuum. At the same time, the head of the judiciary has described the country’s situation in terms such as “enemy infiltration” and “hybrid warfare”, and confirmed that he has also received recommendations from the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence when selecting people.

So perhaps the central question is not why several officials have been replaced, but this: what phase is the judiciary reorganising itself for?

If the real aim is “reform, justice and increased public trust”, its effects should be visible in judicial independence, respect for defendants’ rights, the reduction and abolition of death sentences and harsh punishments, the right of access to a lawyer, and an end to the security-based treatment of civil protest.

But if, in the coming months, we see faster trials of protesters, harsher sentences, wider confiscation of assets, pressure on prisoners and closer links between the judiciary and intelligence bodies, the meaning of the “transformation” announced on 28 Mordad will become clearer.

In that case, what is today called “reform and internal reconstruction” may have another name: reorganising the judiciary for days of crisis.