Why Is Reaching an Agreement with the Islamic Republic Difficult?

Why Is Reaching an Agreement with the Islamic Republic Difficult?

From competing voices of authority to a leader in whose name the final decision is made

Two fundamental questions lie at the heart of today’s diplomacy with Tehran:

When different centres of power in Iran send conflicting messages about war, peace and negotiations, how can the other side know who has the real authority to accept a lasting commitment?

And if the final decision requires the absent Supreme Leader’s approval, but the way that approval is established and verified is unclear to foreign parties and the public, how can an international agreement have credibility and be enforceable?

Perhaps the main issue today is no longer ‘reaching an agreement’; it is who has the structure and the will needed to implement one.

The agreement that has returned to the table

A clear example of this situation is the Islamabad memorandum of understanding: a proposal between Iran and the United States, mediated by Pakistan, intended to pave the way for an end to hostilities and negotiations towards a final agreement. But that process stalled, the conflict flared up again, and each side blamed the other for its failure.

Now the same framework is back on the table. President Pezeshkian’s government still considers it an acceptable basis, and China has also supported the parties’ return to the Islamabad understanding.

But the straightforward, practical question is: what has changed since then?

If an understanding was halted at the implementation stage after being initially accepted, and is now to serve once again as the basis for talks, what concrete guarantee is there that the same fate will not be repeated? Is returning to this framework a genuine attempt to resolve the crisis, or can negotiations also serve as a means of managing time and easing pressure?

When Tehran speaks in several voices

The foreign minister speaks of diplomacy, the president stresses readiness for dialogue, military commanders speak of a forceful response, and the IRGC spokesperson describes negotiations not as the end of the battle, but as its continuation in another form.

These differences in messaging could amount to a division of labour or a simultaneous strategy of ‘diplomacy and deterrence’. But they create a practical problem for the other side: which voice is binding?

If the diplomatic service accepts an agreement, will the other military and security institutions also consider themselves bound to implement it? And if the president speaks of readiness for an agreement, how far does his authority to guarantee the final decision extend—and, fundamentally, who holds that authority?

The legal structure and the challenge of establishing a decision

The Islamic Republic’s legal structure also has its own complexities. Under Article 176 of the Constitution, resolutions of the Supreme National Security Council become enforceable after approval by the Leader. Article 110 also gives the Leader command of the armed forces and the authority to declare war and peace. Depending on the legal form of the document, Parliament may also become involved in the process.

Thus, in Tehran, ‘the authority to negotiate’ does not mean ‘the authority to make the final decision’.

Alongside this structure, a new challenge has emerged. Months have passed since Mojtaba Khamenei was chosen as leader, without any new, verifiable video or audio message from him being released. Officials attribute his absence to security requirements and insist that he is running affairs. The question is: how long can this charade continue?

This article is not concerned with speculation about his personal or physical condition. The issue is how to verify a decision made in the name of the country’s highest authority.

In a sensitive agreement, the parties to negotiations must be able to establish that an accepted commitment has the backing of the institutions and officials authorised within the domestic power structure. When a major decision about war, peace, or nuclear and regional commitments is approved in the leader’s name, how is that approval verified, and how can the foreign party be sure that the final decision is valid?

When the consequences of such a decision directly affect the lives of nearly 90 million Iranians and regional security, transparency in the decision-making process is no longer a personal matter; it is a national and political one.

“The Resistance Front”: commitments on behalf of others?

The issue becomes more complicated when groups known as the “Resistance Front” enter the picture.

If these groups are independent actors, as Tehran says they are, what exactly can the Iranian government guarantee about their conduct: control, influence, an end to support, or merely mediation?

And if Tehran can make a specific commitment regarding their ceasefire or cessation of operations, where does the real boundary of these groups’ independence lie?

This issue is crucial to the durability of any agreement. A commitment regarding the conduct of a country’s official forces is not the same as a commitment concerning non-state actors presented as independent. Ambiguity at precisely this point can make the implementation of an agreement—and even the calculations of mediators such as China and Pakistan—more difficult.

Asymmetry in calculations of “cost and benefit”

Finally, there is also an ideological factor.

Ruhollah Khomeini once famously said: “Whether we are killed or we kill, we are victorious.”

It cannot be concluded from this sentence that today’s decision-makers act according to exactly the same logic. But this outlook is part of the Islamic Republic’s political tradition: a view in which bearing human and economic costs is not necessarily regarded as defeat or as a reason to retreat.

If the two negotiating parties do not share the same understanding of cost, defeat and victory, assessing the impact of economic pressure or military threats becomes more complicated too.

In such circumstances, another question arises: is negotiation merely a means of reaching a lasting settlement, or can it also be used to ease pressure, buy time and rebuild one’s position?

But the experience of the Islamabad understanding makes it necessary to ask this question.

The main problem is not signing an agreement

On the other hand, it is said that the path of diplomacy is not yet closed; mediators are shuttling back and forth, and Tehran speaks of being ready for dialogue. But the real test of an agreement does not come on the day it is signed; it begins when carrying out the commitments becomes difficult and costly.

Diplomacy without clear mechanisms for implementation and verification risks merely postponing and prolonging a conflict rather than resolving it.

To reach an agreement, the negotiating parties must know who in Tehran has the authority to make commitments, who clearly gives final approval, and what structure will guarantee its implementation.

Until this chain of responsibility and authority is clear, every new round of negotiations, even with the parties’ initial goodwill, will face the risk of disputes over implementation.

And at the first serious crisis, the central question returns:

Who in Tehran can say, “We are committed,” and guarantee that the entire power structure will honour that commitment?