The Islamic Republic at an Impasse: Should the War End or Continue?

The Islamic Republic at an Impasse: Should the War End or Continue?

A government caught between external pressure and mounting domestic crises

The Islamic Republic today is facing more than a war or an economic crisis. The issue is more complicated: the government is in a position where emerging from one crisis could bring another back to the centre of the stage.

Continuing the war comes at a cost; ending it will not bring all the problems to an end either.

Months of war, blockade and disruption to oil exports have placed Iran’s economy under heavy pressure. Rising food, housing and medicine costs, declining purchasing power, and the problems caused by restrictions on oil exports have affected people’s lives, directly and indirectly.

In these circumstances, the Islamic Republic has a strong incentive to ease the pressure of war and blockade. Recent negotiations also show that Tehran is seeking to reduce hostilities, lift the blockade and ease some of the economic pressure.

But the central question begins right here:

If the war ends, what will happen inside Iran?

The war and the shadow it has cast over the domestic crisis

For the Islamic Republic, the war is a real external threat, and its human, economic and military toll cannot be ignored. But wartime conditions have also had another consequence inside the country: many social, economic and political demands have been pushed into the shadow of national security.

Amnesty International has reported that, under wartime conditions, Islamic Republic officials have intensified domestic repression; thousands have been arrested, and public access to the global internet was cut off for an extended period.

This evidence does not mean that the government started the war in order to repress the people, or is deliberately prolonging it. There is not enough evidence for such a claim. But it can be said that, in practice, the wartime climate has given the government greater means to control society.

The problem is that continuing this very situation also comes at a cost.

The bill for the war lands on the people’s table

War may temporarily push some political demands to the margins, but it cannot shield people’s livelihoods from its economic consequences.

Falling oil revenues, disrupted trade, import restrictions, foreign-currency shortages and the costs of war are felt in people’s daily lives. High inflation, a collapse in purchasing power and rising prices for essential goods mean that external pressure sooner or later becomes a domestic issue.

This is not just about political opponents.

A pensioner whose pension does not cover the cost of living; a teacher whose income has fallen behind inflation; a worker worried about wages and job security; a patient struggling to obtain medicine; and a family grappling with the cost of food and housing do not necessarily start from the same political position.

But ultimately, they all face one question:

To what extent is the government capable of running the country?

What if the war ends?

This is where the other side of the impasse becomes apparent.

Let us suppose an agreement is reached; the war subsides, oil exports become easier and some of the external pressure eases.

Will water and electricity shortages, inflation, wages, pensions, administrative corruption, unemployment, political prisoners and society’s accumulated demands also disappear when the war ends?

No.

They may even come back into prominence at precisely this point.

During wartime, the government can explain many restrictions and problems in terms of ‘wartime conditions’. But as the external threat diminishes, this explanation also loses its force.

Then a simple question arises once more:

If the war is over, why has our lives not improved?

This may be one of the Islamic Republic’s most difficult contradictions: continuing the war generates social pressure, while ending it could bring that same social pressure out from under the shadow of war.

The bomb: a survival insurance policy or a high-risk calculation?

In this context, the nuclear issue occupies a different place.

One argument raised in part of the Islamic Republic’s political discourse is that stronger deterrence could raise the cost of a foreign attack so much that the regime’s security against an external enemy would improve.

But a distinction must be made between possessing nuclear weapons, having the capability to build them, and being in a state of ‘nuclear threshold’ capability.

Iran officially denies building nuclear weapons, and the available evidence is not sufficient to support the claim that the Islamic Republic’s leaders have made a definitive decision to build a bomb.

Nevertheless, one might ask whether some of the government’s security calculations have moved towards treating more advanced nuclear capabilities as a kind of insurance for the regime’s survival.

This calculation contains another contradiction: moving closer to the nuclear threshold may create deterrence, but at the same time it could heighten the concerns of Iran’s enemies and increase the likelihood of pre-emptive action against Iran.

Where does the main threat lie?

At this point, a more important question arises:

Which is the more fundamental danger to the Islamic Republic: its enemy beyond the border, or discontent within it?

The external threat is real. Military attacks have shown that the government cannot dismiss it as mere enemy propaganda.

But the Islamic Republic’s actions at home also show that it regards domestic protest as a serious threat to its political survival. Internet shutdowns, mass arrests and the deployment of security forces during protests are clear examples of this sensitivity.

So perhaps, rather than concluding from the outset that the government “fears its own people more than the foreign enemy”, it would be better to ask:

Why does a government facing a serious external threat continue to devote such a large share of its capacity to controlling society?

A third path: neither war nor peace

Of course, the Islamic Republic is not trapped between only two options, war and peace.

There is also a third path, one the government has tried in various forms for years:

Neither all-out war nor complete peace; negotiations without resolving every dispute, a temporary reduction in hostilities, the preservation of nuclear capacity, the retention of regional leverage and, at the same time, the continuation of domestic control.

The question is: how long can such a situation be sustained?

Because maintaining a controlled crisis also has a cost, and if the economy, infrastructure and society are worn down faster than the government can manage them, “neither war nor peace” cannot be a permanent solution either.

The Islamic Republic at an impasse

The Islamic Republic’s impasse may no longer be simply a choice between war and peace.

If the war continues, military costs, falling revenues, inflation and pressure on people’s lives will increase, and this pressure could deepen domestic discontent.

If the war eases, some of the external pressure will subside; but the crises that have accumulated beneath the surface of society for years will once again confront the government, no longer shielded by “wartime conditions”.

And if the government chooses the middle course, it will have to bear the cost of a drawn-out situation that neither ends the war nor resolves domestic problems.

War does not resolve the domestic crisis; it may only push it into the background for a time. Nor would an end to the war make that crisis disappear; instead, it could bring it back to the centre of the stage.

So perhaps the Islamic Republic’s central question is no longer simply how to continue the war or how to withdraw from it.

The harder question is:

Once the shadow of war has lifted, what will it do about the crises that still remain inside Iran?