Did the World Not Know — or Not Want to Know?

From the Islamic Republic’s hidden face and governments’ delayed responses to the responsibilities of Iran’s opposition

A Statement That Revived an Old Question

The joint statement issued by ten countries in the Americas on 5 October 2026 against terrorist activity and influence operations attributed to the Islamic Republic revived a fundamental question: have governments only just recognised the nature of this regime, or, despite earlier warnings, have political and economic considerations delayed their response? Reza Pahlavi also welcomed the statement and called on other countries to take a position. But to assess the significance of this event, three issues must be distinguished: governments’ knowledge, their ability to substantiate allegations, and their willingness to act.

How Long Had the World Known?

The assassination of four Iranian Kurdish opposition figures at Berlin’s Mykonos restaurant in 1992, and the German court’s ruling in 1997, raised the role of senior Islamic Republic officials in the operation. The 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires also killed 85 people. In 2007, Interpol confirmed the issue of red notices for six people connected with the case, and in 2024 an Argentine court attributed the planning of the attack to Iran and its execution to Hezbollah. Tehran has denied these allegations. A red notice is not equivalent to a criminal conviction. These cases show that at least some governments have faced serious evidence and allegations for decades.

How Did the Hidden Face Come to Light?

The Islamic Republic’s public support for armed groups has not been hidden; what emerged later were the routes taken by money, the intermediaries, and the links between operational agents and centres of decision-making. For example, in 2023 the US Treasury sanctioned a Hezbollah-linked network in South America for financing through commercial activities. Judicial investigations, financial tracing and cases involving the assassination of opponents abroad have also revealed parts of these mechanisms. Nevertheless, the existence of specific unlawful networks does not establish that all Iranian trade relations in Latin America were fronts for covert operations.

Why Were Governments Slow to Respond?

There is no single answer. Commercial interests, the preservation of diplomatic relations, concern over the consequences of confrontation and the priority given to nuclear negotiations have influenced governments’ calculations at different times. Even during the Mykonos dispute, Germany pursued a policy of ‘critical dialogue’ with Tehran, although it responded more firmly after the court’s ruling. The difficulty of gathering evidence admissible in court about covert operations is also a real obstacle.

Another factor is governments’ own ineffectiveness. In its 2025 report, the British Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee criticised shortages of expertise, inconsistent resourcing and weak coordination concerning Iranian threats. The issue, then, is not always ignorance: sometimes information exists, but the priority or decision-making mechanism is inadequate. Nor have Latin American governments followed a uniform policy: some saw relations with Tehran as an opportunity for trade or foreign-policy independence, while others emphasised security threats. The expression ‘the world’s silence’ therefore conceals differences between countries’ behaviour. Even so, without independent evidence we cannot conclude that all governments knowingly turned a blind eye.

What Has Changed?

Threats once viewed mainly within the framework of Middle Eastern disputes have now become matters of domestic security for other countries as well. In 2025, the head of Britain’s domestic intelligence service reported the identification of more than twenty potentially lethal Iran-linked plots within a year. Legal and diplomatic measures in 2026, along with the ten-country statement, also indicate a stronger response, although each country’s reasons are different. It remains to be seen whether these positions will lead to sustained practical cooperation or remain statements alone.

Who Paid the Price of Delay?

The victims of terrorist operations, their families and opponents threatened abroad have paid direct human costs. The people of Iran, too, have lived under repression, economic crisis and the consequences of their government’s foreign policy. Yet the direct responsibility of those who carry out repression must not be conflated with foreign governments’ weak responses or the effects of sanctions and war. Defending global security must not mean forgetting the safety and livelihoods of the Iranian people.

What Should Iran’s Opposition Do?

When Reza Pahlavi or other opposition figures welcome international condemnations, they are taking a political position; their direct influence on governments’ decisions can be established only through independent evidence. The opposition’s responsibility goes beyond requesting external pressure: it must gather evidence that can be cited, demand legal action against those responsible and protection for opponents, and consistently distinguish between the government and the Iranian nation. Any call for sanctions or political pressure must also weigh the human consequences and ways of reducing harm to citizens.

More importantly, the opposition must offer a clear programme for the future: an independent judiciary, accountable security institutions, equal rights for citizens and a free media. Political unity must not become silence about the mistakes of leaders and those around them. A movement seeking to end unaccountable government must demonstrate openness to criticism in its own conduct today.

Is Condemnation Enough?

This history shows that the issue is not simply recognising the Islamic Republic’s character; the gap between knowing and deciding must also be examined. Statements acquire practical value when they lead to independent investigations, protection for victims and effective legal action. The opposition, too, must be judged not by the intensity of its slogans, but by its documentation, cooperation and adherence to democratic principles.

Three questions remain:

If the warnings are old, why were the responses not proportionate?

Will today’s condemnations lead to sustained action?

And can the opposition use this opportunity to defend the people and build a free future, without considering itself immune to criticism?

S. Rouzbeh

The Joint Statement of Ten Countries in the Americas on 5 October 2026

In a joint statement, ten countries in the Americas condemned the terrorist activities and malign influence of the Islamic Republic and its proxies.

The statement says these activities include ‘planning lethal attacks, raising funds unlawfully, political interference and foreign influence operations’, as well as actions intended to strengthen terrorist networks, pressure intended adversaries, obstruct legal or administrative processes, or harm regional security. The signatories stressed: ‘The Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies must stop these actions now.’

The governments of the United States, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago signed the statement. They also announced that they would strengthen cooperation and coordination in response to these threats.