Tell Me Who Your Friends Are, and I’ll Tell You Who You Are! (China)

Part Two: China, cheap oil, surveillance technology and eleven votes against

The ropes that hold up the Islamic Republic

In the first article in this series, on Turkey, I asked whether countries benefit from the Iranian market or from the special arrangements created by the Islamic Republic. Now it is China’s turn. Its relationship with Tehran cannot be explained simply in terms such as ‘strategic friendship’. To understand it, we must begin with oil shipments and follow the trail to technology contracts and voting chambers at the United Nations. Could these three areas be ropes that strengthen the government’s hand?

1. A relationship beyond slogans

Tehran and Beijing signed a 25-year co-operation agreement in March 2021. There was much talk of $400 billion in Chinese investment, but neither the text nor the public documents confirm that figure as a firm commitment. The first step in any serious examination is to distinguish an announcement of co-operation from a contract that has been carried out. What we can measure is how much oil was bought, what technology was sold and how Beijing acted officially in international institutions.

2. Oil: profit for the buyer, revenue for the seller

According to Reuters, China bought an average of around 1.38 million barrels of Iranian oil a day in the first half of 2025, accounting for most of Iran’s oil exports. Independent Chinese refineries benefit from the sanctions and the discount on Iranian oil. The US–China Economic and Security Review Commission estimated that China bought around $31.2 billion worth of Iranian oil in 2025. That amount does not appear in China’s official customs figures as direct imports from Iran. My question is straightforward: does a Chinese refinery need Iran, or does it need oil sold at a discount because of sanctions? That distinction separates the benefits of ordinary trade from those arising from the Islamic Republic’s particular circumstances.

3. Following the money to military bodies

In April 2026, the US Treasury sanctioned Hengli, an independent Chinese refinery. It said that Hengli had received oil sold under the supervision of Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars, the oil sales arm of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for Iran’s military sector. This is an allegation by an official US body, not a court ruling against the Chinese government. Even so, unlike an aggregate trade figure, it identifies a specific route from buyer to seller to the body receiving the revenue. In September 2026, Reuters reported on another mechanism, in which Iranian oil revenues were converted into credit for buying goods and carrying out projects in China. Anonymous sources said that between $2 billion and $2.5 billion had passed through the arrangement in a year. Beijing said it was unaware of any such mechanism. The matter therefore calls for independent clarification rather than a definitive conclusion about all of China’s dealings.

4. Technology: from the internet to surveillance

A February 2026 report by ARTICLE 19 examined the role of Chinese companies in expanding Iran’s surveillance and censorship capabilities. It discussed, among other things, ZTE’s 2010 contract for technology to monitor calls, text messages and internet traffic, as well as the presence of equipment from companies such as Tiandy and Hikvision in the Iranian market. Huawei was also reported to have offered deep packet inspection equipment, but offers should not all be treated as contracts that were carried out. In January 2024, the commander of Iran’s Law Enforcement Command and China’s Minister of Public Security signed a memorandum of understanding on police co-operation. Its full text has not been made public. These documents show official co-operation and the potential for technology transfer. To establish that a particular device played a role in the arrest of a protester, however, we would need evidence specific to the case.

5. Eleven votes against, not eleven vetoes

A count covering April 2022 to January 2026 found that China voted against decisions and resolutions directly concerning human rights in Iran at least eleven times: six times in the Human Rights Council, four in the General Assembly and once in the Economic and Social Council. None of these votes was a veto. On 24 November 2022, China opposed establishing a fact-finding mission on the Woman, Life, Freedom protests and even called for the relevant provision to be removed from the resolution. On 23 January 2026, it also voted against an urgent investigation into the crackdown on the latest protests. Beijing says it opposes country-specific mechanisms and interference in domestic affairs. In practice, this position has meant opposing some of the international mechanisms for investigating violations of the rights of the Iranian people.

6. Where is the rope?

China’s relations are not confined to the Islamic Republic. It also trades extensively with Tehran’s regional rivals and has made no mutual defence commitment to Iran. We therefore cannot automatically infer from oil sales, technology transfers or diplomatic votes that China intends to keep this government in power. Nevertheless, these ties may provide the governing apparatus with revenue, surveillance capabilities and diplomatic backing. My final question to the governments and companies involved is this: what did you buy, what did you sell, what did you gain and how much did you know about the consequences for the rights of the Iranian people? Identifying the ropes does not mean passing judgement in advance. The aim is to let people see who is affecting their country’s future and how, so they can judge for themselves.

Sources and documentation

1. US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, fact sheet on China–Iran relations, March 2026

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2026-03/China-Iran_Fact_Sheet--A_Short_Primer_on_the_Relationship_.pdf

2. Reuters, the mechanism for exchanging Iranian oil revenues for Chinese goods, 10 September 2026

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-billion-dollar-sanctions-dodge-kept-chinese-goods-flowing-iran-2026-09-10/

3. US Treasury, sanctions on Hengli refinery, 24 April 2026

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0472

4. ARTICLE 19, the role of Chinese technology in Iran’s surveillance and censorship infrastructure, February 2026

https://www.article19.org/resources/tightening-the-net-chinas-infrastructure-of-oppression-in-iran/

5. Chinese government, memorandum of understanding on police co-operation between Iran and China, January 2024

https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202401/17/content_WS65a705eec6d0868f4e8e3294.html

6. United Nations, vote on establishing a fact-finding mission on the protests in Iran, November 2022

https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/meeting-summary/2022/11/afternoon-human-rights-council-establishes-fact-finding-mission

7. United Nations, Human Rights Council vote on the crackdown on protests, January 2026

https://searchlibrary.ohchr.org/record/35192

8. United Nations, vote on removing the Islamic Republic from the Commission on the Status of Women, December 2022

https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4000041

Originally published by Iran Global on 3 November 2026.

https://www.iranglobal.info/fa/node/203810