Legal Questions in Ali Zarei's Case: From Political Activity to a Death Sentence — What Is the Missing Link?

By S. Rouzbeh

Even under the Islamic Republic's own laws, a death sentence for ‘corruption on earth’ requires specific conditions and elements to be established. Yet what has been made public about Ali Zarei's case so far leaves important questions about the legal basis of the sentence, the proceedings and the quality of his defence.

If the conduct attributed to Ali Zarei consisted mainly of political activity, speeches, propaganda against the system, publishing news and contact with opponents, how did Branch 23 of the Revolutionary Court arrive at ‘corruption on earth’ and a death sentence on the basis of those acts?

And if Article 286 of the Islamic Penal Code requires conduct on an extensive scale and consequences such as ‘severe disruption of public order’, ‘insecurity’ or ‘major damage’ for corruption on earth to be established, which specific act by Ali Zarei produced such a consequence?

This article does not set out to pronounce Zarei innocent or guilty. Its question is simpler, yet more fundamental: is what we know of the case so far sufficient to justify the most severe punishment available in law?

The full judgment is not yet publicly available. It is therefore impossible to reach a definitive assessment of all the court's reasoning. But this lack of information does not make the legal questions disappear. Alongside the texts of existing laws and regulations, this examination considers and draws together published legal commentary on Article 286 and similar cases.

First question: what, precisely, does ‘extensive’ mean?

The first issue concerns Article 286 itself.

This article does not equate political activity, publishing material or even committing a security offence, in itself, with corruption on earth. The law refers to certain acts being committed on an ‘extensive’ scale, together with consequences such as severe disruption of public order, insecurity or major damage.

So if the court has referred to Zarei's ‘extensive political activity’, half the question remains unanswered.

Extensive on what scale? How many acts? Over what period? With what reach and impact? And, above all, what were the consequences of those acts?

In criminal law, particularly when the death penalty is at issue, terms such as ‘extensive’, ‘severe’ and ‘major’ cannot be stretched through an elastic interpretation. The principle of strict interpretation of criminal laws requires that doubt and ambiguity should not be expanded to the defendant's detriment.

Second question: where is the legally required consequence?

Even if we assume that Zarei's activities were extensive, it must still be established which act of his directly produced a consequence required by Article 286.

What order was severely disrupted?

What specific insecurity was created?

What major damage occurred?

And how was the connection between the defendant's conduct and those consequences proved?

These are not secondary questions. If the consequence specified in law has not been established, simply repeating the phrase ‘extensive action’ cannot substitute for proving the elements of the offence.

Third question: how did a discretionary offence become grounds for execution?

Another area of uncertainty concerns the similarity between the wording published about Zarei's case and Article 4 of the ‘Law on Aggravating the Punishment of Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist Regime and Hostile States’.

That law contains references to political, cultural, media and propaganda activities, ‘creating and publicising fabricated damage’, and preparing or publishing false news.

Yet the same law provides for discretionary, or ta‘zir, punishments for such conduct where it does not amount to corruption on earth.

The crucial question, then, is this: what additional and decisive element did the court establish in Zarei's case that raised the punishment from imprisonment to execution?

Until the judgment is published, it cannot be said that Branch 23 relied directly on this article. But the similarity of the language is substantial enough to make an explanation of the sentence's legal basis necessary.

Fourth question: what does ‘fabricated damage’ mean?

This may be the most ambiguous phrase in the case.

What is meant by ‘creating a portrayal of fabricated damage’? Which damage? Which image or account? Which authority determined that it was fabricated, and on what evidence?

This issue is particularly significant in Ali Zarei's case because he is among those who suffered eye injuries during the protests of 1401.

But the available information should not be taken further than it allows. It is still unclear whether the court's reference to ‘fabricated damage’ concerned his eye injury.

If it did, another legal question arises: which medical or expert opinion confirmed that the injury, or the account of it, was fabricated? Were his medical documents and treatment records examined?

Fifth question: how thoroughly is the judgment reasoned?

Article 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a court judgment to be reasoned, justified and grounded in law.

Consequently, phrases such as ‘disrupting security’, ‘false news’ or ‘extensive activity’ cannot, on their own, provide the reasoning for a death sentence.

The judgment must explain which act occurred, when and where it occurred, what evidence proved it, what consequence it produced, and how that consequence met the requirements of Article 286.

If that chain of reasoning is absent from the judgment, the issue is no longer merely political opposition to the sentence; it is a challenge to its judicial reasoning.

Sixth question: defence counsel and the composition of the court

Reports have been published about restrictions on Zarei's access to a lawyer during the preliminary investigation. But the more important question concerns the trial itself.

Which lawyer defended him? Was the lawyer chosen by him or appointed by the court? Did counsel have effective access to the file and the evidence? Was there sufficient time to prepare a defence?

Article 348 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes the presence of a lawyer mandatory in proceedings concerning offences punishable by death.

The composition of the court also matters. Under Article 297, the Revolutionary Court must sit in the composition prescribed by law when hearing offences punishable by death.

It must therefore be made clear which judges took part in the proceedings and whose signatures appear on the judgment.

Seventh question: speeches delivered abroad

Some of Zarei's activities took place outside Iran, including in Germany.

It cannot simply be argued that, because the conduct took place abroad, Iran's judiciary has no jurisdiction. In certain circumstances, the Islamic Penal Code provides for proceedings concerning the conduct of Iranian citizens outside the country.

But jurisdiction to hear a case is not the same as proof of an offence.

If part of the case concerns political speeches, opposition to the Islamic Republic or support for Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, the court must show which specific words or actions crossed the boundary of political expression and how they constituted the elements of corruption on earth.

From Mohsen Shekari to Ali Zarei: two cases, one warning

In Mohsen Shekari's case, the court relied on a set of acts, including blocking a street, using a bladed weapon and injuring a member of the Basij, to establish moharebeh, or ‘enmity against God’. Zarei's case is different: at least in the publicly available information, he has not so far been accused of killing, injuring anyone or using a weapon.

The case of Sahand Nourmohammadzadeh, meanwhile, showed that a death sentence issued by a Revolutionary Court can be overturned by the Supreme Court and returned for a fresh hearing.

This comparison has a practical implication: legal objections, when raised precisely, with supporting grounds and in time in an appeal to the Supreme Court, are more than a theoretical discussion.

This case must also be pursued through the law

Human rights activists are entitled to demand a halt to Ali Zarei's execution. But that demand can go a step further.

Lawyers and legal scholars must confront the judiciary with the Islamic Republic's own laws: where is the material element of the offence? How was the consequence specified in Article 286 established? What is the causal connection? What expert assessment underpins ‘fabricated damage’? How was the court constituted, and how was an effective defence secured?

If these defects are present in the case, they could have real significance in an appeal to the Supreme Court. There can be no guarantee that the Supreme Court will overturn the sentence, but the law provides a route for challenging and quashing it.

In cases where a human life is at stake, this may be one of the most effective tasks lawyers and legal scholars can undertake: making the fullest and most sustained use of existing laws to limit the possibility of death sentences being issued and carried out.

And the central question remains:

If Ali Zarei's death sentence rests on law and clear evidence, which specific act of his, proved by which evidence and producing which consequence specified in Article 286, transformed him from a political opponent into someone guilty of ‘corruption on earth’?